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The Combating Terrorism Exchange begins its fifth volume with this issue. Con-
tributors, from military personnel to academicians to policy makers, continue 
to send us thoughtful, thought-provoking essays that tackle the ever-changing 
world of terrorism from a variety of angles, as the present issue demonstrates.
Afghanistan still features prominently as a locus of jihad and a subject for 
analysis, but, sadly, Iraq is back in the headlines. There were many who warned 
that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 would likely unleash a sectarian firestorm 
in that country, but few could foresee that, 12 years after the US overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein, internecine violence would engulf the entire region. While this 
issue does not include any articles on the Islamic State (aka ISIS or ISIL) per se, 
the radical army’s impact on other jihadist organizations and mainstream Islamic 
communities around the world is an undercurrent that runs through all of the 
articles.
The use of social media such as Twitter and YouTube to spread radical messages is 
a hot topic these days, and one that CTX has covered extensively, as for instance, in 
our special issue, “Social Media in Jihad and Counterterrorism” (Vol. 2, No. 4). 
Nonetheless, Captain Edval Zoto tackles the subject from a novel angle, by using 
the Albanian language as a unique marker to track the spread of jihadist videos 
via YouTube. He finds that even in Albania, which is generally pro-Western, 
Muslim youth are captivated by well-produced, visually exciting videos spread by 
ISIS supporters. “The participation of Albanians in the Syrian jihad,” Zoto sug-
gests, “may be correlated with successful jihadist information operations online.” 
As the recent attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris and several towns in northern 
Nigeria make painfully clear yet again, the dilemma of ideological seduction is 
one the world must resolve.
Surinder Kumar Sharma offers a brief, chilling description of the Pakistan-based 
jihadist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), which, he warns, may prove more 
dangerous to the world in the long run than ISIS. While ISIS runs amok in Syria 
and Iraq, demanding media attention through acts of barbarous cruelty, HuT is 
quietly building a global infrastructure of radicalized youth and deep-pocketed 
Arab support in preparation for the global Khilafat.
In the next article, Dr. Guy Duczynski, Dr. Samuel Huddleston, and Colonel 
Jaroslaw Jablonski describe an interactive analytical method for use on “wicked, 
messy problems,” such as creating sustainable Afghan security forces. This 
process, which aggregates and distills stakeholder knowledge rather than simply 
applying outside “expertise,” helps stakeholders identify realistic steps to move 
from a dysfunctional system to one that is reliable and sustainable.
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The final feature article takes us to Nigeria, where author Muhammad Feyyaz seeks to explain the extraordinary levels of 
violence unleashed on that country’s population by the radical anti-Western Islamist group Boko Haram (BH). Like similar 
groups, BH latched on to the economic and political grievances of a marginalized population, in this case the Muslims 
of Nigeria’s northern states. But, Feyyaz argues, BH’s escalating violence is in direct response to brutal government crack-
downs and extrajudicial killings by unregulated security forces. The solution, he concludes, must come from both sides of 
the conflict.
This issue’s CTAP interview is with veteran Time magazine photojournalist Robert Nickelsberg. Dr. Leo Blanken spoke 
with Nickelsberg about his 30-year career covering many of the most important social and political events in Central and 
South Asia. Some striking samples of the photographer’s work illustrate the interview.
Movie critic Dr. Kalev Sepp is back, with a look at films about prisoners of war who try to escape. From The Bridge on the 
River Kwai, a famous World War II film about the morality of collaboration versus survival, to director Werner Herzog’s 
controversial depiction of the story of POWs in the jungles of Laos in 1966 (Rescue Dawn), to the elaborate and enter-
taining deceptions of Argo, audiences never tire of watching captives pit their wit and will against terrifying odds in the 
attempt to regain their freedom.
Finally, our colleagues at the Joint Special Operations University have two new publications on offer. You can read the 
synopses and find links to these articles and the full JSOU archive in the Publications Announcements. 
Thanks for your interest in CTX. Please send any questions and comments you may have about this or any issue 
of CTX to CTXeditor@GlobalECCO.org. If you have an article, a work of art or photography, a story, or any other 
original composition relevant to counterterrorism that you’d like to see published in our journal, please forward it to 
CTXsubmit@GlobalECCO.org. CTX is a quarterly, peer-reviewed journal. All submissions will be evaluated by area experts 
and, if accepted, professionally edited prior to publication. We especially encourage members of the military from every 
part of the world to send us your thoughts, ideas, and essays.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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Dr. Guy Duczynski is a former member of Booz Allen Hamilton’s 
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a master’s degree in war studies from Quaid-i-Azam University, both in 
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US Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and conflict manage-
ment from the Modern Institute of Informatics and Management, 
Islamabad. Feyyaz’s latest publication, “Conceptualizing Terrorism Trend 
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on Terrorism 7, no. 1 (2013). 
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served as an assistant professor. His research interests include statistical 
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US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 2009 and a PhD in information 
and knowledge management in 2012. COL Jablonski has a combined 39 
months of deployment time to Bosnia and Kosovo, Iraq in support of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Afghanistan in support of the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force.
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Burma, and Indonesia. His images have appeared in publications and 
broadcasts that include Time, the New York Times, Newsweek, the Wall 
Street Journal, the Financial Times, the Guardian, Paris Match, Stern, 
CNN, and NBC. Nickelsberg has taught photojournalism and conflict 
coverage at the California Institute for Integral Studies in San Francisco. 
His photographs have been exhibited at the Philadelphia Museum of 
Art, the International Center of Photography in New York, and the New 
America Foundation in Washington, DC. His recent book, Afghani-
stan: A Distant War (New York: Prestel, 2013), received the Olivier 
Rebbot Award in 2013 for the best reporting from abroad in books and 
magazines. Nickelsberg is a graduate of the University of Vermont. 
Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is a senior lecturer in the Defense Analysis depart-
ment at NPS. He served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for 
Special Operations and Counterterrorism, and was an expert member 
of the Baker-Hamilton Bipartisan Commission on Iraq. He co-authored 
Weapon of Choice: US Army Special Operations in Afghanistan (Dept. of 
Defense Center of Military History, 2006), and in 2009, Foreign Policy 
magazine named him one of “The Ten Most Influential Counterinsur-
gency Thinkers” in the United States. He earned a master’s degree in 
military art and science from the US Army Command and General Staff 
College, and a PhD in history from Harvard University. A former US 
Army Special Forces officer, Sepp earned his Combat Infantryman Badge 
in the Salvadoran Civil War.
Surinder Kumar Sharma is currently a consultant with the noted 
Indian think tank, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 
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Asia, particularly Kashmir. He holds a graduate degree in history from 
Meerut University in Uttar Pradesh, India, and is fluent in Arabic and 
French. He writes regularly for the Times of India, Pioneer, the Tribune, 
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(with Anshuman Behera) is Militant Groups in South Asia (New Delhi: 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and Pentagon Press, 2014). 
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Captain Edval Zoto, an infantryman by specialty, proudly serves in 
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 Hizb-ut-Tahrir: The New Islamic State Surinder Kumar Sharma, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses 
While the world’s attention is fixed on the activities of the 
dangerous and ruthless Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, or simply IS1), there 
is another militant organization worthy of serious attention. Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
(HuT), or the Party of Liberation, is a radical Islamist group that, like IS, calls for 
the uniting of the Ummah and the return of the Caliphate. 
HuT was founded in Jerusalem in 1952 by a Palestinian, Sheikh Taqiuddin 
al-Nabhani, with the help of Khalid al-Hassan, a founder of the militant Fatah 
faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Assad Tamimi, a spiritual 
leader of the Islamic jihad movement, both of whom became important leaders 
of the group.2 Although at the ideological level there is much in common 
between HuT and IS, the dramatic growth of IS, its highly publicized atrocities, 
and its rapid acquisition of territory could cause its own downfall if a US-led 
military coalition launches a military offensive against the group. In contrast, 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a slow and steady player; it has cleverly avoided any intense 
global scrutiny while spreading its ideology and support base in different parts of 
the world. HuT, therefore, has the potential to become an even more dangerous 
terrorist group than IS. 
IS may be trying to exploit a tendency noted by retired Major General Robert 
Scales in a recent Wall Street Journal article: “Western militaries fight short 
wars well and long wars poorly.”3 But any apparent advantage from a protracted 
conflict could backfire for the al Qaeda breakaway group, as one analyst pointed 
out: “[The] Islamic State’s fundamentals are weak, and it does not have a sustain-
able endgame.”4 The same analyst went on to suggest that the group is getting 
more credit than it deserves and that its support among the local population is 
fairly superficial, making the group vulnerable to external interventions. Interest-
ingly, the majority of individuals and entities who support IS also support HuT, 
raising questions about whether the eventual defeat of IS could result in the end 
of terrorism in Asia and elsewhere. 
This is where HuT’s strategy is different. With a reported presence in nearly 50 
countries, it is slowly increasing its social capital by keeping away from overt 
acts of terrorism while luring the educated young with ideology. Headquartered 
in London, the group has branches in Central Asia, Europe, South Asia, and 
Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, where it has managed to garner great 
influence. In South Asia, HuT has a significant presence in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan. 
Although HuT has reportedly found a foothold in India, its presence and 
influence have not made any significant impact. On its website, HuT claimed 
that it had organized a demonstration in 2010 at Batla House in Delhi in protest 
against Israel’s alleged atrocities.5 The demonstration, which was attended by 
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presence in neighboring Bangladesh and Pakistan, however, should be a cause of 
concern for India and the larger global community. 
The Bangladesh chapter, which started in 2001, is headed by Mohiuddin Ahmad, 
a professor at Dhaka University. It is important to note that the organization 
has been able to penetrate not only state-run educational institutions like Dhaka 
University, but also private establishments. It is worrisome that in Bangladesh, 
HuT has managed to gather the support of many intellectuals, including doctors, 
lawyers, and professors. HuT was officially banned in Bangladesh in 2009 for 
anti-state activities, apparently because of its possible involvement in the Bangla-
desh Rifles mutiny that took place the same year.6 During the mutiny, security 
forces arrested six HuT members who were carrying incendiary pamphlets. 
According to media reports, HuT had planned another mutiny in 2010 and is 
suspected to have been part of the foiled army coup in 2011 against Bangladeshi 
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.7 While there is no known case of HuT’s direct 
involvement in any violent activity in Bangladesh, its growing support base could 
become a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism.
Compared to Bangladesh, HuT has a longer history in Pakistan, where it estab-
lished its base in 1990. The group remained underground until 2000, when its 
cadres launched a massive publicity campaign through the distribution of leaflets 
promoting Ummah unity and the Caliphate near mosques in Islamabad, Lahore, 
and Rawalpindi. HuT considers Pakistan to be a suitable place for the seat of 
a future Caliphate (or Khilafat) due to its geo-strategic location and its rich 
natural and human resources. HuT’s plans to establish an Islamic state propose 
three stages. The first involves educating the common people and indoctrinating 
the educated class; the second stage involves co-opting people who hold influen-
tial positions in the government, the military, and the civil service; and the third 
stage is the establishment of the Caliphate itself.
Pakistan banned HuT in 2003 after it was linked with several terror plots, 
including a plot to kill former President Pervez Musharraf.8 Media reports have 
since suggested that HuT has made several attempts to infiltrate the Pakistani 
Army in order to initiate the process of establishing a Caliphate. This suspicion 
was further supported by the arrests of five army officers for their HuT links. 
Despite the ban, the group is reportedly deepening its support among the intel-
ligentsia and military circles.9
Another interesting aspect of HuT is that while it advocates a strict interpreta-
tion of Islam, it does not oppose modern technology and makes use of the 
internet to spread its ideology among educated youth. This seeming paradox is 
further reflected in how the outfit deals with sophisticated weapons, including 
bombs and land mines. HuT may not be directly involved in terrorist activities, 
but it approves the use of violence and armed force to achieve the Caliphate. Ac-
cording to media reports, HuT has an armed wing called Harakat ul-Muhojirinfi 
Britaniya that is training its cadres in chemical, bacteriological, and biological 
warfare.10 
HuT’s global ambition and activities are bankrolled through private donations 
from local entrepreneurs to Islamic charity organizations. Media reports suggest 
that members pay 10 percent of their incomes to the group. Wealthy sheikhs 
from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, who embrace the pan-Islamic 
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agenda, also fund the outfit. This financial support is one of the reasons that 
HuT believes it will be able to establish the Caliphate. 
It is said that HuT commands a base of over one million members worldwide. 
This is far higher than what IS has claimed to have. HuT has its headquarters 
as well as a strong base of support in the United Kingdom and is also wide-
spread in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan, in which country alone its 
membership is estimated to range from 7,000 to 60,000. Reports claim that 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 members 
each, while Kazakhstan has about 300 members.11 Although there are no 
credible estimates of the group’s strength elsewhere, it undoubtedly has some 
presence in a number of other Muslim countries such as Iran, Iraq, Algeria, 
Sudan, Yemen, and Jordan. 
Given the fact that HuT already has a wide reach and is successfully inducting 
and radicalizing educated youth, the outfit has the potential to stage coups 
and uprisings against governments and regimes that it considers un-Islamic or 
aligned with anti-Muslim powers. HuT may well prove dangerous because it has 
immense influence on people, especially in the way that it legitimizes the cause to 
establish a Caliphate. While the world’s focus currently is on IS, it would be a  
grave folly to ignore the growing influence of HuT and its global agenda.  v
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Factors for the Success of Jihadist 
Information Operations in Social Media
Captain Edval Zoto, Armed Forces 
of the Republic of Albania
No one questions that terrorists in general, and jihadists1 in 
particular, use the internet as their main propaganda tool. Not only have the 
quantity and quality of the information that jihadists upload evolved over time 
with the development of the internet, but the strategies used by such groups and 
individuals to spread their ideology and attract the public to their cause have also 
become more “tech-savvy.”2 Although most of us may be well aware of changes to 
the internet because it affects our daily lives, the ways in which terrorists match 
their strategies with the new opportunities that the internet offers is a topic that 
remains inadequately explored. The objective of the research described in this 
article is to identify some specific elements in the contemporary online envi-
ronment that contribute to the success of jihadist information operations and 
internet strategies.3
There have been several attempts to study jihadist internet strategies, and there 
is considerable research into technological products that will make it easier for 
security agencies to analyze data from social networking sites. The tools that are 
currently available consist of computer programs that track, collect, and process 
the data gathered through social networking sites or from the Web. These pro-
grams enable researchers and investigators to find and structure data, but they do 
not provide further qualitative analysis, which is left to the human operator. The 
data structuring and the resulting analysis itself also depend on human assump-
tions, which are too often based on factors deriving from incomplete research. 
This kind of research faces another well-known problem, which is the difficulty 
of identifying a limited and representative statistical sample of the environment 
that is to be studied. Certain aspects of the internet—indiscriminate, anony-
mous, borderless, and extremely fast—when combined with the rapid growth of 
jihadist content, make it extremely difficult to isolate a representative sample of 
jihadist information operations and then submit that sample to qualitative and, 
especially, quantitative analysis. 
This study overcomes both of these problems by selecting a limited sample: 
the characteristics of jihadist information operations developed for the specific 
audience of Albanian language speakers.4 The singularity of the Albanian 
language merges the perpetrators with their prospective audience and provides 
a well-contained sample from which to analyze certain characteristics of jihadist 
information operations on social networking sites. This process of collecting and 
analyzing jihadist online content and network data allows us to identify specific 
factors that contribute to the success or failure of jihadist information operations 
on the internet, especially on social networking sites. The language serves as a 
useful limiting factor in building a consistent sample of jihadist propaganda, 
and Albanian words are quite easy to search and track within the social net-
working sites.5 After building a data set from an analysis of the jihadist content 














techniques allowed us to isolate and verify those factors that contribute to the 
success or failure of jihadist information operations.
The Internet and the Jihadist Enterprise
From its emergence following World War II to the present, the internet has 
evolved through two main phases. The first phase, which may be called the 
traditional internet, includes the period from about the mid-1980s, when the 
internet became available to the wider public, to 2005, when the first social 
networking sites appeared. The second phase encompasses the modern internet 
and the explosion of social networks, from 2005 to the present. A common 
pattern that characterizes both phases is the increasing number of internet users, 
while a distinguishing characteristic of each phase is the way in which people use 
the internet. Three general characteristics of the internet—its lack of barriers to 
access, speed of communication, and the high level of anonymity that it provides 
to the general user—have also made it a preferred tool for Islamist extremists.  
Throughout modern history, dissident groups have resorted to acts of ter-
rorism from a position of weakness in relation to their enemies. To succeed 
in their campaign, terrorists need publicity. Sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer 
maintains that terrorism is strongly connected with the publicity it gener-
ates, and that without an audience, terrorism would cease to exist.6 The 
need for the right kinds of publicity makes terrorists choose their targets 
carefully. Symbolism (e.g., taking down the World Trade Center towers) is 
more appealing than the direct effect of simply killing people. In this way, 
terrorist attacks fit media demands for sparkling audiovisual content and also 
attract sympathizers to the terrorists’ cause.7 The terrorists’ success is defined 
not only through their political achievements against the government (or 
governments, in the case of international terrorist groups) but also in terms 
of recruiting and logistical support, which are strongly connected with the 
publicity that surrounds the terrorist group. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli 
observe that al Qaeda, for example, exists only in a “cathode mode” and that all 
of its operations are dependent on the media space that the group can occupy, 
especially the types of media that offer the greatest amount of spectacle.8 From 
this perspective, the technological development, and especially the moderniza-
tion of the global media environment, have helped Osama bin Laden’s jihadist 
initiative succeed to the degree that its success depended on publicity. Given 
the poor internet access in bin Laden’s initial area of responsibility, the Arabian 
Peninsula, and to a lesser extent the entire Islamic world, from the 1990s to 2001 
al Qaeda’s main source of publicity was Arabic and international television chan-
nels. In regard to the design of the videotapes bin Laden prepared for broadcast, 
Joseph Tuman notes, 
Bin Laden invented a policy tailored to video clips and ads; brief 
speeches that were easily incorporated into prime-time news; care-
fully designed, simple settings; and straightforward speeches devoid 
of affectation or sophistication.9
The public appeal for the whole jihadist struggle came from a central point, 
which was bin Laden. In his short appearances, bin Laden himself looked more 
like an object for display: a simply dressed man of few words, calm but emotion-
ally appealing to the masses. In the less personal environment of mass media, al 
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airing and later to other Western stations for retransmission demonstrates careful 
management not only of the media profile of the organization’s leader but also of 
the organization itself. 
Al Qaeda “used abundant audiovisual, as opposed to ideological, references, 
which have an impact on a young Arab audience that owes its education to tele-
vision rather than to the crumbling educational system” that is found in several 
Middle Eastern countries.10 Observations regarding jihadists’ early exploitation 
of audiovisual media to disseminate reports on their activities for propaganda 
purposes can be valuable for understanding al Qaeda’s more recent exploitation 
of the internet.
The number of jihadist websites still amounted to only about a dozen by the end 
of the 1990s. It was the 9/11 attacks on US soil that would dramatically change 
how al Qaeda communicated its messages, not only between itself and the wider 
public, but also within the organization. After the invasion of Afghanistan by 
US and coalition forces in late 2001, al Qaeda’s information operations went 
almost entirely online, due to the physical dangers of trying to produce and 
distribute television-ready video while under military attack. Embracing the 
internet for their information operations allowed the jihadists to overcome that 
problem, but it left them vulnerable to other difficulties. The main problem they 
faced was managing the flow of information to preserve their traditional hierar-
chical structure. 
With regard to message management, the higher leadership of al Qaeda was 
not prepared for the anarchical mode of internet communications. Both bin 
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of the international jihad movement, 
believed in centralized management of the information campaign. In his essay 
“Knights under the Prophet’s Banner,” al-Zawahiri described three important 
elements that he regarded as necessary for conducting jihad: a leadership that 
people can trust, follow, and understand; a clear enemy to strike at; and the 
courage and willingness to act.11
This centralized model preferred by the elder jihadists was inevitably challenged 
by the younger generation of jihadist ideologues. Abu Musab al-Suri offered the 
main critique to the centralized model in his 2004 book The Global Islamic 
Resistance Call, in which he strongly maintained that indoctrination and 
awareness-building would not follow a centralized campaign, and introduced 
what has come to be called “leaderless jihad.”12 Al-Suri identified the internet as 
a “powerful engine for communicating with the public at large,”13 and promoted 
it as an inexpensive tool that might serve to overcome the difficulties associated 
with spreading the call for jihad through traditional media. In his recommenda-
tions regarding the building of messages, al-Suri also pointed out the need to 
consciously tailor the content of the message to the caste or stratum of society 
at which it would be directed.14 Another supporter of the leaderless jihad and 
an advocate of the internet jihad is Anwar al-Awlaki. In his treatise “44 Ways to 
Support Jihad,” which appeared in 2009, al-Awlaki asserted that the most media 
impact for the jihadist cause could be realized through the use of internet tools.15 
The recommendations put forward by prominent jihadist ideologues are quite 










well-defined media strategy is missing. That leaves ample space for other jihadists 
and sympathizers to use self-initiative in spreading the call to jihad. 
The Nature of the Jihadist Enterprise in the Balkans
The sudden fall of communism and the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation in 
the early 1990s, and the transition of the Balkan states from autocratic regimes 
to more liberal democratic ones, allowed several factions engaged in terrorism 
and Islamist radicalization to conduct their “business” in the region, especially in 
countries with large Muslim communities.16 In the case of Albania, all religious 
activities had been banned in 1967, when the Communist regime decided reli-
gious expression was incompatible with the atheistic character of the country’s 
political ideology. By 1990, however, religious observance began to revive unop-
posed by the government, and after the fall of Albania’s Communist government 
in 1992, the law that banned religions was abolished. Religious communities 
and organizations began to flourish. Along with the national institutions that 
sought to manage this religious revival, many foreign religious organizations 
rushed in to play a role and establish their presence in the country. 
As Islamic religious organizations emerged on the Albanian scene, they 
became aware of the lack of qualified indigenous religious leaders to drive the 
revival of Islam, and their immediate solution was to take an active role to 
address this issue. Foreign Islamic radical organizations exploited this lack by 
offering scholarships in Islamic studies to Albanian youth, while disseminating 
religious texts for free and encouraging freelancers sympathetic to radical 
Islamic sects to offer religious services to the public. Observers reported a 
similar approach in all the Balkan countries, not only in Albania. 
The attitude of Albania’s governing authorities toward this growth of Islamic 
entities in Albania was practical. The country’s inability to attract Western 
aid and financing at the levels required for a smooth transition to a liberal 
market economy forced the Albanian authorities to be more receptive to the 
Islamists’ activities than they might otherwise have been, despite disagreements 
over these issues in Parliament and in public opinion.17 Given the permissive 
environment and weak rule of law in the newly independent countries, many 
of the Islamist organizations entering the Balkans became a safe haven for 
individuals engaged in terrorist activities. The eruption of internal conflicts, 
first in Bosnia (1992–1995), then in Albania (1997), Kosovo (1998–1999), and 
Macedonia (2001), and the resultant spread of weapons and ammunition, made 
those countries a preferred venue for jihadist-type engagements supported and 
financed primarily by radical Islamist NGOs operating in the region.
As a result of two decades of radical Islamist propaganda, viewpoints, and pros-
elytizing, in recent years, jihadism has been flourishing in Albania, and youths 
from Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia are joining the ranks of Islamic terrorist 
organizations operating in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. Social networking sites and 
the internet in general serve as these groups’ communications battle horse for 
disseminating information about their activities and recruiting support to their 
cause. The reasons behind their effectiveness (or lack thereof ) are the topic of 
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Elements of Success and Failure: Establishing the Analytic 
Database
Any approach to analyzing the potential success or failure of jihadist informa-
tion operations on social networking sites should take into account two major 
influential factors: first, the recommendations made by prominent jihadist 
ideologues concerning the public image of the jihad, and second, the exploita-
tion of social networking sites’ capabilities by jihadists. The jihadist ideologues’ 
viewpoints on information management, although mostly of a rhetorical nature, 
especially when related to the traditional and high-level leadership, can be 
framed so as to be operationalized for further analysis. Ideological divisions over 
the issue of organization type (centralized vs. decentralized) for the jihad do not 
influence how we classify ideological perspectives on the management of the 
information, or mediatic, jihad. Opinions of this nature have to be accepted and 
assumed to be complementary to each other, independent of the source.
Previous research into and analysis of the writings and public messages of 
prominent jihadist ideologues yielded the following four elements, which the 
movement’s leaders consider necessary for the conduct of a successful jihadist 
information operation: 
Quantity and outreach—This twofold element appears in the rec-
ommendations of every prominent jihadist ideologue. In terms of 
our analysis, this element presupposes that activists should fill the 
internet with jihadist material through as many outlets as possible 
in order to reach the optimal audience. 
Networking—Prominent jihadists recommend that spreading the 
call to jihad should be seen as a common effort. On this matter, al-
Suri and Mohammed bin Ahmed al-Salim are the most outspoken, 
and both offer detailed recommendations. Framed for the purpose 
of this study, this element assumes that to achieve success, jihadists 
should actively participate in the common effort to spread radical 
content over the internet, provide feedback, expand their reach, and 
share materials through different outlets. 
Specific tailoring—Leading jihadists suggest that successful ac-
tivism on the Web requires communications to be tailored to the class 
and customs of their specific audience. This element presupposes that 
jihadist information operations will tend to match their narratives to 
local conditions, by exploiting local languages and symbolism and 
offering “solutions” to local grievances through jihad. 
Audiovisual media production standards—Prominent jihad-
ists recognize the power of well-produced messages. This element 
presupposes that higher audiovisual production and editing values 
plus originality improve the likelihood that a media campaign will 
be successful.
These four elements, described in this way, serve as a theoretical explanation 
of the factors for the potential success of jihadist information operations, 












Operationalization is done through a process that takes into account the current 
developments and opportunities offered by the internet and, for this study 
in particular, social networking sites. Generally speaking, social networking 
sites provide users with publicly available data on the performance of other 
users’ postings, or other users’ activity on the site. A user may choose to remain 
anonymous or restrict the release of his data to third parties, but for our pur-
poses such users have no analytical value because our object of study is focused 
on extroversive uses of social networking sites. Table 1 lays out the user data that 
can easily be obtained by visiting two major social networking sites, YouTube 
and Facebook, categorized according to the four elements described earlier. Such 
a scheme can help us measure the performance of various jihadist information 
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Table 1: Specific Units of Measurement for the Four Elements of 
Successful Jihadist Information Operations
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The measurement units displayed in table 1 can be collected more or less as they 
appear from the Web pages of social networking sites.19 Some of the more sub-
jective measurements, such as the “quality of editing” and “audiovisual quality,” 
may have to be coded by the researcher, for example, by assigning weight points 
for aspects like spelling, grammar, image sharpness, sound quality, and so on. 
The collection of data for the measurements shown in table 1 provides detailed 
information for each jihadist information operation on those two social networking 
sites, but identifying factors of success or failure requires further processing. 
The data obtained for the quantity and outreach element are of fundamental 
value, not only because they can be quantified, but also because the bigger the 
audience, the greater the chances that the jihadist information operation being 
measured will be successful. This numerical measure alone does not, however, 
provide any qualitative analysis of the operation. By using various methods of 
analysis that compare the data for the quantity and outreach element with the 
measures of other elements, it is possible to obtain qualitative insights into the 
overall performance of each jihadist information operation compared to others. 
This approach can also reveal trends and patterns of performance based on the 
two major influential factors mentioned earlier: the suggestions of prominent ji-
hadist leaders and a realistic quantitative data set extracted from the social networking 
sites where common jihadists and their sympathizers carry out their part in the jihad.
Building and Analyzing the Data Set
To obtain better results from our study of jihadist information operations on 
the internet, in addition to the theoretical and textual-historical approaches to 
identifying factors of success or failure, we built a data set that helped us both 
quantitatively and qualitatively test empirically determined factors. (Our data 
were collected between September and November 2013; the last update took 
place on 22 November 2014.) The building of a data set for this purpose brings 
up a few challenges, which are described briefly in the following subsections.
Where to Start?
The first decision is to choose which social networking site’s data to mine for 
jihadist-inspired content. We chose YouTube, which was the first major website 
for user-generated content, and also one of the most visited social networking 
sites. YouTube is widely used by jihadists and their sympathizers to spread audio-
visual content intended to serve the purposes of the global jihad.20 YouTube is 
also the third most-visited website in Albania, following Facebook and Google.21 
Although most Albanians use Facebook for social networking even more than 
they do YouTube, we chose YouTube because of its earlier presence in the market 
and its higher perceived anonymity of operation and because it is the preferred 
social networking platform for jihadists to conduct their information operations. 
Local Language-Driven Research
Rohan Gunaratna observes that although al Qaeda operates as an international 
organization, its affiliates tend to operate locally and recruit from “among their 
own nationalities, families, and friends.”22 This is a quite logical way to grow an 
organization. In much the same way, we begin our study by focusing on jihadist in-
formation operations in the Albanian language, which is spoken almost exclusively 












of Macedonia, and Montenegro, and by Albanians living in other countries. No 
other nation in the world naturally speaks Albanian. For the purposes of this 
research, by looking for jihadist information operations in Albanian, we can 
automatically identify the target audience and obtain a highly representative 
sample within the global “population” of jihadist information operations. 
This kind of research can begin by matching keywords in the predetermined 
language with the subject of the research. We used only one keyword: jihad, 
which in Albanian is written xhihad and is pronounced the same as in English. 
This small spelling change was enough to provide us with substantial results 
when we put it into the YouTube site’s search engine.23 The search engine identi-
fied 4,530 results (see figure 1).24 (Note that this result represents the number of 
times the word is found throughout the YouTube database, not the quantity of 
videos addressing the subject.) The word xhihad may be found within the titles 
of videos, in the “About” section of each video, or in the “Comments” sec-
tion, and may even be part of a username as well. The number of actual videos 
that are of interest for our research is much smaller. In the end, only 84 videos 
fulfilled the requirements to be processed for data collection.
These videos show up first, of course, if the researcher applies the relevancy filter 
available on the YouTube search engine. The relevancy filter brings videos con-
taining the word xhihad in their titles or usernames to the top of the results list, 
followed by videos in which the word xhihad is found most frequently within 
the video’s Web space (in the “About” and “Comments” sections). We found that 
the number of hits sharply decreased by the time we had made a subject-driven 
evaluation of the first 200 videos that appeared, and also by that point the word 
xhihad no longer appeared in the titles. Of course, there might be other videos 
dealing with the same subject that were not included in our research set, but that 
is not an issue of concern for our purposes. The goal of this element is to attract 
and influence as many users as possible. These users need first to be “pulled” into 
the video space, and to do so, the use of keywords within the title of the video is 
the most logical method. In some cases, users might have decided to unsubscribe 
from appearing on public searches, but this also excludes them from the scope 
Screenshot of YouTube Search  






CTX | Vol. 5, No. 1
of our research, because the point of the research is to identify posts that are 
purposefully within the public sphere. 
Subject-Driven Research
The keyword search exploits the automated services provided by social net-
working sites, but it also generates problems, especially with regard to the subject 
matter and relevancy of the results set compared to the purpose of the study. 
The word jihad has an ambiguous meaning—generally not the meaning that 
is promoted by al Qaeda and other violent Islamist organizations. Due to this 
ambiguity, the original search results might not be as accurate as needed for 
the purposes of analysis. At this point it is necessary to determine which videos 
deserve to be identified as jihadist information operations, rather than videos 
with an entirely different purpose. 
According to Bruce Hoffman, al Qaeda’s jihadist propaganda “has three basic 
themes: the West is implacably hostile to Islam; the only way to address the 
West is in the language of violence; and jihad is the only way for true believers.”25 
This explanation is quite clear, but these themes do not have to occur simultane-
ously to characterize a communication as coming from an al Qaeda sympathizer. 
Since the crackdown on al Qaeda in Afghanistan, many jihadist organizations 
have franchised al Qaeda’s cause and methodology, and they shape their 
messages according to their needs, often framed carefully in a way that is 
more compelling to the public. A jihadist-inspired communication (infor-
mation operation) may concurrently contain facts, jihadist rhetoric, religious 
rhetoric, religious verses, and other elements that are not likely to be considered 
illicit by the target audience. Jihadist content on social networking sites in the 
Albanian language typically does not confront the public with full-fledged al 
Qaeda-type propaganda, as noted by Hoffman—rather, the jihad is carefully 
framed and often disguised with harmless religious verses. 
At this point, the researcher needs to be very careful about which content to 
identify as jihadist information operations. When we determined which of the 
videos that turned up in our initial search to include in our database, we con-
sidered whether they invoked the general themes mentioned by Hoffman, but 
we also took into consideration any elements that we knew were forbidden by 
local laws, such as inciting violence, overt discrimination, or the use of offensive 
language. We also categorized as jihadist information operations those videos 
that promoted a code of conduct condemned by local religious authorities, such 
as segregation and discrimination based on religious patterns, and videos that 
promoted important actions that went against the recommendations of the 
local religious leaders, such as calls to join the jihad in Syria. The recruitment 
of Albanians for Syria’s internal conflict, which is accomplished primarily by 
framing participation as a religious duty, is a salient problem nowadays in the 
Albanian-populated regions of the Balkans. Thus, our database also includes 
videos that seek the moral disengagement of the public from civic norms and 
their recruitment into the jihadist cause, no matter whether the videos make a 
direct call for violent action.
The identification and selection of useful data from the results of the initial 
search query might seem to be a difficult process, but it is worth pursuing 
because it also allows the researcher to identify YouTube channels that can 











because jihadist-inspired videos often are branded, either by the actual men-
tion of specific terrorist organizations or because the videos carry the signature 
brands of known jihadist media organizations.26 Of course, the more familiar 
the researcher is with this sort of material, the easier it is to process the data set. 
This step follows the principles of A. Aaron Weisburd’s “artisanal approach,” and 
it is somewhat time-consuming, but to date there is no automated method for 
obtaining data of similar quality.27 
Creating the Data Set
Once the population of jihadist videos has been identified, it is necessary to ex-
tract data from them and develop a data set that the researcher can then analyze. 
The data that we collected reflect the measurement units shown in table 1, taken 
from YouTube. It is important to note that our research was video-based rather 
than channel-based. YouTube allows users to establish their own accounts, called 
channels, where they can post their videos. Because we searched specifically for 
videos that contained the word xhihad in Albanian, that is the basis of our data 
set. Users can, however, also research channels. The collection process requires 
that researchers record a significant number of data points, so we recom-
mend setting up the measures in a spreadsheet in whatever order best fits the 
researcher’s needs.
Results from the Data Set Analysis
The data set we obtained through the YouTube search engine contains data 
from 84 videos that we identified as jihadist information operations. There 
may, of course, be other videos that could be identified as jihadist information 
operations if the search were to include other keywords in Albanian, but such a 
search goes beyond the purpose of this study.28 Our intention here is to provide 
an example of how research might be conducted to identify and test factors 
of success in jihadist information operations on social media, rather than to 
analyze YouTube-based jihadism in the Albanian language.
The First Element: Quantity and Outreach
The data we obtained from the collection process was quite vast and left room 
for different types of analysis.29 For the purpose of this study, we tested only the 
four jihadist-recommended elements of success laid out in table 1. We began by 
designating the element of “quantity and outreach” as an independent variable. It 
is fundamental to the jihadists’ success—above all, to “speak and to be heard”—
independent of how they frame the message. The production and dissemina-
tion of jihadist messages not only communicate the jihadist ideology but also 
influence levels of recruitment and donations to the cause. In the world of social 
networking sites, if jihadist information operations actively reach out to as many 
site users as possible, then they have successfully fulfilled their mission. 
To build up the data set, we represented the element of quantity and outreach in 
YouTube by the numerical values of views, likes, subscriptions, the length of time 
that individual videos were watched, shares, comments, and the overall number 
of videos posted by the channel (user). The number of views is the most repre-
sentative of these because it is the one that is always reported, independently 
of the will of the channel owner (see the left column in table 2). The analysis 









CTX | Vol. 5, No. 1
Videos that have been online for a longer time have had more opportunity to 
become popular than more recent posts, so we needed to adjust these values. We 
therefore divided the number of views by the number of days the video had been 
online and derived a value that represents the views per day for each video (see 
the right column in table 2).
As table 2 shows, some of the videos that ranked in the top five for total number 
of views do not appear in the top five for views per day. The following brief 
descriptions of the top five most popular jihadist videos (by total number of 
views) are derived from the data found within the data set. 
The video “***nah_1,” which ranks first for number of views and fourth for views 
per day, was posted in March 2013.30 This video shows an Albanian mujahedeen 
fighter in Syria among other foreign mujahedeen. In terms of its quantity and 
outreach measures, this video performance is above average. It is also the most 
watched (calculated in hours of time watched)31 and the most commented 
on (383 comments), and it contains a hyperlink that encourages the viewer to 
connect (and thus become further engaged) through a Facebook profile. The 
audiovisual quality of this highly popular video is nevertheless fairly poor.
The third- and fifth-ranked videos (***l1m_2 and ***nal_1, respectively) are quite 
similar to the first (***nah_1) in several ways, despite the lower number of views. 
Both also were quite recent when the data were recorded, and both relate to 
the jihad in Syria. The number of comments generated on these videos is above 
average. These two videos, however, have a higher audiovisual quality, and they 
both display the producer’s brand.
The second (***dii_3) and the fourth (***HGT_1) videos have a few differences 
from the other three videos. They are quite old by social media standards (dating 
back to March 2009 and February 2007 respectively), and they reflect a general 
perspective of the jihad (both were made well before the current Syrian crisis, 
which began in 2011). The video “***dii_3” also provides a hyperlink for the 
public, and it carries the brand of an Albanian-named audiovisual editing studio. 
The fourth video (***HGT_1) has comparatively fewer elements of success 















Ranking by number of views 
regardless of the video’s time 
online (in descending order 
from most to least)
Ranking by number of views per 
day (in descending order from most 
to least)
Video Views Video Views Views/day
1 ***nah_1 41622 ***nal_1 14974 365.2
2 ***dii_3 39386 ***l1m_2 29069 363.4
3 ***l1m_2 29069 ***ter_1 9008 214.5
4 ***HGT_1 23759 ***nah_1 41622 165.8
5 ***nal_1 14974 ***jda_1 5003 142.9
Table 2: The Five Most Popular Jihadist Information Operations Videos from the Data 
Set (Ranked by Number of Views and Number of Views/Day)
February 2015
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The ranking of videos according to the number of views per day yields a slightly 
different result from the ranking for total views. The three Syria-related videos 
from the first list are still present in the top five videos viewed per day, and 
the top-ranked video on this list portrays an Albanian mujahedeen calling in 
Albanian for viewers to join the jihad in Syria. The content of all the top five 
videos in this second list relates to the Syrian jihad, and in terms of the elements 
for success, these videos more closely follow the recommendations of prominent 
jihadist leaders in terms of “going local”—that is, reflecting local customs and 
exploiting community grievances through jihadist propaganda. The quantity and 
outreach measures for this group are above the average for the whole data set, 
and their audiovisual quality measures are near the top of the scale. All five of the 
videos were recent for the research period, with the oldest dating back to March 
2013 and the most recent from October 2013. The quantity and outreach measure 
shows not only viewers’ predisposition toward videos that encourage them to join 
the jihad in Syria, but also that the participation of Albanians in the Syrian jihad 
may be correlated with successful jihadist information operations online.
Using the quantity and outreach element’s data, we used simple regression 
analysis to draw out further observations that substantiate the prominent 
jihadists’ recommendations. The data we analyzed were the number of sub-
scriptions (in general, not to a specific video) to a channel and the number of 
videos posted by the channel. The number of subscriptions is actually better 
than the number of views as a measure of the potential success of a jihadist 
campaign because there are many YouTube viewers who occasionally wander 
onto the website and skim the content without paying a lot of attention to it. 
A subscriber, by contrast, is interested in the type of videos posted by a selected 
channel. In this case, there is a high positive correlation value of 0.72 between 
the two measures: the more videos that are uploaded to a channel, the higher 
the number of subscriptions there will be to that channel. 
By increasing the number of subscribers, channels have more opportunities to 
tailor their messages in ways that will influence their subscribers’ opinions. As 
was mentioned earlier, jihadist activists on the internet do not generally declare 
themselves to be full-fledged al Qaeda supporters; rather, they carefully reveal 
their messages within postings that include general religious narratives. The 
same can be said about the channels that are part of our research data set. A 
quick overview showed that some of these channels contain a number of videos 
that hardly qualify as jihadist information operations. But that, too, may be part 
of the jihadists’ information strategy. Some YouTube users will be attracted by 
general, non-militant Islamic videos and subscribe to a channel that later exposes 
them to jihadist propaganda videos. This exposure is essentially guaranteed be-
cause YouTube’s subscription mechanism promotes videos posted on subscribed 
channels to the subscriber ahead of other videos. 
Another regression that verifies the quantity and outreach recommendation is 
one that correlates the “number of views” measure with the number of days the 
video has been online. Our study showed that the correlation is positive and 
its value is 0.24. In simple terms, the longer a video stays online, the greater the 
number of times it will be seen by general users. Thus, the sheer number of mes-
sages pushed out to the public is not the only factor that increases the popularity 
of the jihadist cause; the stable presence of the message among the public is also 
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for jihadist messages, and social networking sites make it even easier than the 
traditional Web to encounter those types of messages. 
The Second Element: Testing the Jihadist Information Network
On the one hand, testing the second recommendation, networking for jihad, is 
a difficult task. On the other hand, research on the networking elements can be 
very profitable in terms of identifying and targeting further research elements in 
the data set. Network analysis also incorporates the third recommended element, 
the localization of the jihad.
Figure 2 shows the connections among YouTube users (the red nodes) who 
comment on the respective videos. The topics of the videos are distinguished by 
the color of the ties that connect them to the red nodes: Afghanistan/Iraq in 
gray; general call to jihad in dark purple; jihadist leaders in pink; Syrian conflict 
in green; and West vs. Islam in yellow. As mentioned earlier, this kind of imaging 
allows very interactive users (those who comment on two or more videos of 
the same topic) to be identified immediately and targeted for further research. 
Users may be also identified as very interactive and very competent users if they 
comment on two or more videos promoting different topics. Such users become 
a potentially interesting subject for further analysis. For 
example, the presence of several big clusters of red nodes 
linked by green ties shows that the Syrian conflict is most 
users’ favorite topic for comment. The red nodes located 
between the four “Syrian conflict” clusters represent 
users who have commented on two or more videos 
related to the Syrian conflict. These can be categorized 
as very interactive users. The red node that connects 
the green cluster to the two purple clusters represents a 
user who has commented on a Syrian conflict video and 
also on a “general call to jihad” video. This user can be 
identified as both very interactive and very competent, 
and might warrant closer scrutiny.
The sociogram presented further down in figure 3 con-
tains some of these individuals. For the purpose of this 
study, there was no need to conduct further analysis on 
these users’ activities, but processing the networking and 
localization elements through social network analysis 
(SNA) software and methodologies would offer relative 
results that could be useful for further study.
The Third Element: Tailoring to the Audience
Figure 3 shows that the majority of jihadist YouTube videos (the red triangles) 
relevant to our study are related to subjects such as the Syrian conflict and the 
general call to jihad (the colored squares represent the five topics identified 
earlier). From an Albanian perspective, this topic-based illustration of jihadist 
information operations is compelling. The number of videos on the jihadist 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq remains small because Albania shares almost 
nothing in common with these countries, and the jihadist cause there is simply 
not compelling to Albanians. The same applies to videos about the West vs. 
Islam. Albanians in general are very pro-Western, and it is hard to change the 
local narratives on that perspective. 
Figure 2: Connections among YouTube Users Who Comment on 




As in figure 2, the sociogram depicted by figure 3 makes 
it possible to identify special actors among those who 
posted the videos in our data set. Here, the users are 
channel owners (the black dots), among whom the very 
active ones are those who have uploaded two or more 
videos on the same topic. Those channel owners who 
have posted videos on two or more topics are considered 
highly competent actors and are easily spotted in the 
space between the topic clusters, where they connect to 
multiple topics. The sociogram shows that the over-
whelming majority of channel owners within our data set 
posted only a single video; there are several owners who 
posted on two or three topics, but only one who posted 
to four, and none to all five topics. 
As in figure 2, once special actors have been identified in 
this way, they can be subjected to further research and 
analysis. 
The Fourth Element: The Audiovisual Effect
We tested the last recommended element, the audiovisual effect, through regres-
sion analysis, and by taking the values for total number of views and number of 
views per day as independent variables, while the measures for editing quality 
and audiovisual quality were taken as dependent variables. The results show that 
both sets of correlations are positive and statistically quite significant;34 that is, 
if the videos are better edited, include more local features, and are of a better 
audiovisual quality, the number of views and average views per day are expected 
to be higher. 
In conclusion, our analyses clearly demonstrated that the prominent jihadist 
leaders’ recommendations on how to conduct effective jihadist information 
operations on the internet are valid and important. By contrast, operations that 
disregard these recommendations are more likely to result in failure (i.e., attract 
few viewers and fail to bring donations or recruits to the cause), especially on 
social networking sites. 
Conclusions
Jihadists will continue to use the internet as their primary tool for conducting in-
formation operations. Their transition from the use of Web 1.0 to the use of Web 
2.0 applications may be slow, but it is inevitable, because jihadists need to reach 
the wider public at any cost, whether they successfully influence it or not. Social 
networking sites have presented less tech-savvy jihadists with problems such as 
learning how to exploit such sites, along with the restrictions and dangers posed 
by counterterrorism bodies that mine the internet for information on terrorist 
activities. By raising their popularity scores on the Web, jihadists may attract the 
attention of counterterrorist researchers who are carrying out the kinds of data 
analysis highlighted here.
The lack of a centralized information management structure contributes to 
a further degradation of jihadist information operations on the Web. As the 
al Qaeda leadership is hunted and captured or killed, there is no sign of a 
Figure 3: Sociogram of Channel Owners and the  
Number of Videos They Posted to Any of Five Topics
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potential reestablishment of the information management structure, as it existed 
in the pre-9/11 era. The future of jihadist information operations belongs to lone 
jihadists or smaller disconnected groups of individuals. From a counterterrorist 
perspective, the decentralized (or leaderless) jihad presents new challenges, 
especially in the information management and intelligence-gathering fields. 
Jihadist activists on the internet may exploit the opportunities offered by the 
internet without any significant restrictions. Many Western commentators have 
suggested that the information operatives of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS or IS) seem to be more comfortable with social media than 
the group’s predecessors. But even the ISIL operatives are making mistakes quite 
similar to those made by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during the US-Iraq war, such 
as posting a constant stream of atrocities, or showing themselves comfortably 
ensconced in well-kept homes as they talk about jihad. ISIL’s target audience, 
however, is young jihadists, who are coming from all over the world to join the 
fight in Syria. For this purpose, ISIL will make use of both local (Syrian and Iraqi) 
jihadists and international jihadists to promote the internet jihad. Linguistics 
plays a role here, and our model of using a keyword search to isolate a data set 
may help identify and analyze jihadist internet networks and the characteristics 
of their information operations. 
The identification of elements that help ensure the success of jihadist informa-
tion operations on social networking sites can provide counterterrorism special-
ists with a tool to distinguish important and potentially important jihadist 
communications from the vast amount of jihadist-inspired Web content. In 
this study, the four elements were tested and found to be valid. In addition to 
highlighting these elements of success, our research also describes a methodology 
that researchers and analysts can use to build their own data sets and further 
test the prominent jihadists’ four recommendations on the conduct of a specific 
information campaign. Further analysis of these four factors may serve different 
purposes, from the assessment of jihadist information strategies to the identifica-
tion of key jihadist Web activists, who could then be closely monitored and tar-
geted by counterterrorism forces. By assessing jihadist information strategies on 
the internet, counterterrorist forces may also plan and conduct counteractions 
that improve the collection of intelligence, rather than simply shutting these 
Web spaces down and compelling the jihadist propagandists to innovate.  v
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When the future arrives, it may differ wildly from the present 
in detail, but it will resemble the existing pattern in a few major 
respects. There will be only one of it—future—and each param-
eter of change will have a particular value; its parts will coexist 
within an intricate system of mediating rules … and it will trail 
behind its own distinctive history. Its parts will fit together 
(however uneasily) and its changing patterns will show sequential 
consistency through time.1  
Aside from the challenges associated with establishing and 
maintaining security within Afghanistan, government officials are faced with the 
additional and equally complex task of implementing and maintaining appropri-
ate sustainability measures over the longer term. In this paper, we explore the 
subject of Afghan security force sustainability using General Morphological 
Analysis (GMA), a method that has proven to be highly suited to the detailed 
analysis of wicked, messy problems. The sustainability problem in Afghanistan 
exhibits systemic features that conspire to cause underperformance; if an appro-
priate level of sustainability is to be achieved, these systems-based elements must 
be managed. We developed a factors-and-conditions array (called a Zwicky box) 
that captures the primary factors associated with sustainability; extends these 
factors into a range of conditions from the most favorable to the most unfavor-
able; specifies the current and desired (end-state) conditions; and highlights 
a series of planned condition changes to get from here to there.2 We highlight 
key stages of the GMA process throughout and draw comparisons between 
operational design, critical vulnerabilities, asymmetry, and other military plan-
ning terms. The method we describe here does not, however, claim to replace 
conventional military planning processes; rather, it complements such processes 
and invites a deeper appreciation of the problem as a whole. Instead of offering 
specific solutions, our intent is to demystify the problem and inform purposeful 
actions that move toward resolution.    
Wicked, Messy Problems: What are They?
When dealing with problems that have a large social component, planners 
encounter a level of complexity and interconnectedness that render conventional 
planning methods unsuitable. The problems are wicked and messy because they 
are ambiguous and (initially) opaque; they are ill-defined; they encompass 
strong moral, political, and professional interests;3 they involve many inter-
relationships, often within a nonquantifiable problem space; they react, often 
unexpectedly, to attempts to bring about change—they won’t keep still; and 
finally, there is the potential for many unintended consequences that planners 
must remain alert to, akin to Garrett Hardin’s observation that “we can never 
















The first detailed account of wicked, messy problems appeared in Policy Sciences 
under the title “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.”5 The authors 
were two urban planners who described a problem that initially appeared to be 
straightforward and solvable through the application of appropriate science. 
What they discovered, however, is that the surface problem actually concealed a 
host of additional subproblems that an unsuspecting planner could inadvertently 
stir up to magnify and enrich the initial difficulties.
Some examples of wicked, messy problems are
 ¡ Gun ownership in the United States
 ¡ Smuggling of people into Australia through Indonesia
 ¡ Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean
 ¡ Underutilization of public transport
 ¡ Overuse of petrochemical fertilizers
 ¡ Terrorism
 ¡ Obesity
Each of these issues embodies a range of stakeholders who often have competing 
interests and unclear and sometimes diametrically opposed definitions of what 
constitutes an acceptable solution, as well as the method for achieving that solu-
tion. The problems often cross organizational and jurisdictional boundaries, 
thus confusing the question of who is responsible and inviting the involvement 
of a variety of hostile, neutral, and cooperative actors. On top of all these 
difficulties, their solution typically demands a change in learned, often “institu-
tionalized” behavior. Security and law enforcement sustainability in Afghanistan 
shares many of these characteristics and qualifies as a wicked, messy problem of 
considerable complexity.
Solving Wicked Problems
We use the term solving here cautiously, because wicked problems are never fully 
solved. Through dispassionate study, however, they can yield a more favorable 
set of conditions associated with the area of interest. It is these potential shifts in 
condition from the current to the desired that the GMA method seeks to reveal. 
Due to the high social content of these problems, which often is the primary 
source of their wickedness or messiness, progress must be accompanied by 
changes in behavior, aside from any organizational reforms associated with the 
solution.
The Sustainability Problem in Afghanistan
The modern use of the term sustainability arose from the environmental move-
ment of the late twentieth century and primarily indicates the preservation of 
biodiversity and the protection of natural resources. Ecological sustainability 
seeks to regulate human behavior within the four interconnected domains of 
ecology, economics, politics, and culture. According to the United Nations 
Commission on Environment and Development, “sustainability is meeting the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”6
This general definition of sustainability is only partially useful for our specific 
area of interest. With regard to law enforcement and national security in 
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Afghanistan, we take sustainability to mean the following: achieving appropriate 
law enforcement and national security capability outcomes while remaining within 
the carrying capacity of the nation’s economic, human, and other resources to 
accommodate capability outcomes into the future. This definition recognizes that 
large public institutions must deliver services today and into the future and that 
predatory social or institutional behavior based on patronage, tribal, or other 
short-term gains represents another form of the “tragedy of the commons.”7
Afghanistan has received approximately US$20 billion of financial and material 
aid in an effort to establish and maintain security. The declared US policy goal 
behind the provision of aid was to “prevent Afghanistan from ever again be-
coming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the 
world.”8 After 13 years’ expenditure of blood and treasure, the broadly accepted 
assessment is that these efforts have been unsuccessful. Violence and instability 
remain endemic, and governance is localized, fragmented, and largely tribal.9
When donor nations gave (in some instances, sold) helicopters, weapons, 
vehicles, radios, uniforms, facilities, ammunition, computing and information 
management systems, and other materiel to the Afghan police and military, the 
donors expected (or, in some cases, simply assumed) that the Afghan security 
forces would develop the capacity to sustain these systems over the long term. 
This would ensure that entire-life support, maintenance, servicing, inspections, 
replacement, upgrades, training, and other essential activities would become 
institutionalized within the Afghan security forces to the point that Western 
involvement and support could be reduced and eventually discontinued. Such 
an outcome aligned with the general definition of sustainability and the as-
sumption that present-day decision making is mindful of the future. Indeed, the 
important steps required for institutional or organizational sustainability should 
be independent of the equipment or logistical items the recipients are seeking to 
manage (sustain).
A sustainable law enforcement and security environment has failed to coalesce 
in Afghanistan despite all those years of effort and billions of dollars, and it 
has become apparent that there is a set of systemic and chronic weaknesses that 
combine to undermine any capability achievements. For example, one of the 
most vulnerable and costly items affected by this situation is a fleet of Mi-17 
helicopters that provide vital force projection and mobility across the rugged ter-
rain of Afghanistan. Experts acknowledge that few of the 30 Mi-17s that would 
represent full operational capability in 2017 will be airworthy within five years 
due to inadequate maintenance, servicing, and repair.10
The systemic liabilities have been widely documented and reported: 
Corruption, ineffective program monitoring, budget shortfalls at 
all levels, inability to generate revenue, and limited public financial 
management capacity continue to plague the Afghan national gov-
ernment. Weak cooperation between national and subnational levels 
of the government hampers significant long-term sustainability and 
limits access to public goods.11
The principal aim of this article, therefore, is to explore these factors and build 
an assessment framework to guide the system towards a more favorable set of 
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WILL FAIL.
looking at law enforcement and national security, but it could just as easily be 
public health, public education, or some other major institution. If we were to 
substitute one for the other (take away the helicopters and so forth and replace 
them with doctors, nurses, and hospitals), then similar system essentials would 
need to remain intact and functioning.            
In the case of a wicked problem like Afghan security, a sustainability model built 
simply on compliance and adherence to rules and regulations will fail. There 
are deeper motivational elements that must be brought to bear, because sustain-
ability suggests responsible, proactive decision making, together with innovation 
that anticipates unintended or undesirable effects and avoids or minimizes their 
occurrence.
The General Morphological Analysis Process
The GMA process can be summarized as an approach that progressively deepens 
planners’ understanding of a problem and informs the development of pur-
poseful actions. It is ideally suited to “structuring and analyzing the total set 
of relationships contained in multi-dimensional, non-quantifiable problem 
complexes.”12 It mirrors many of the features associated with operational design, 
although the method presented here offers more structure and less discourse 
than that promoted in the literature of operational design.13 
The six steps of GMA are as follows:
Step 1: Compose a question that will focus stakeholders’ individual 
views and perceptions toward a shared orientation. This question 
usually begins with “What are the factors that… ?” 
Step 2: Record the factors that the stakeholders generate in answer 
to the question in step 1. 
Step 3: Reduce the list to seven or fewer primary factors and then 
name a range of conditions that characterize each of these, from 
the most favorable to the least favorable, thereby creating a factors-
conditions array. For planners to achieve the necessary gestalt aware-
ness, develop a representative acronym in this step.  
Step 4: Pair each condition with one from another factor in a 
systematic manner (e.g., factor 1/condition 3 + factor 2/condition 
2) and then perform a pairwise comparison by judging each of the 
condition pairs according to their internal consistency: “Can these 
two conditions logically coexist?” Filter from consideration any 
configuration of factor-condition pairs that contains a pair that is 
illogical or contains inconsistencies. This step dramatically reduces 
the number of considered configurations to the much smaller set of 
conditions across all factors that could actually occur (an example 
follows in the next section).
Step 5: Agree on the current configuration (i.e., the current 
conditions across all factors) and the desired configuration (the 
desired conditions across all factors) and examine the intermediate 
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configurations for completeness. The intermediate configurations 
(sets of conditions across all factors) describe possible future states 
that lie between the current condition and the desired end-state. The 
current, intermediate, and desired configurations now describe the 
continuum upon which the campaign is built. 
Step 6: Starting from the current conditions field, plot a series of 
incremental condition changes that shift the area of interest from 
where it is to where you want it to be.  
Step One: The Sustainability Question 
The area of interest is “sustainability within the Afghanistan national security 
and law enforcement institutions.” We assume that we have assembled a group of 
individuals who share a concern for this subject—they do not have to be senior 
decision makers, but they must be stakeholders—each of whom brings his or 
her portion of the problem into the planning environment for consideration. 
If we are going to identify a shared starting point and a common orientation to 
the area of interest, then it is essential that we develop an appropriate opening 
question.
Following are some sample questions, from which only one would be selected:
 ¡ What factors influence sustainment within Afghanistan’s security and 
law enforcement institutions? 
 ¡ What factors contribute to the successful sustainment of Afghanistan’s 
security and law enforcement institutions?
 ¡ What factors influence the level of successful and independent sustain-
ment of Afghanistan’s security and law enforcement over the longer 
term?
It can be seen that each of the questions introduces a slightly different theme 
and area of focus and would, therefore, elicit a slightly different set of responses. 
It is vital that a single and agreed question be analyzed. For the purpose of this 
article, we selected the third question for our test group of stakeholders to study, 
because it contains the important elements of “successful and independent” and 
is positioned “over the longer term.”  
Step Two: Generate the Factors
After formulating the most meaningful question for sustainability, we asked our 
participants to take up a pen and record their answers on Post-it Notes—one 
answer per note, but no limit to the number of an individual’s answers. Although 
this stage did not directly involve Afghan nationals who are responsible for 
national security and law enforcement sustainability, it did comprise a group 
of individuals who have been central to the training, advisory, and assistance 
missions that are focusing on this problem.14 These responses (included in 
appendix 1) are considered valid for the purpose of setting out the method and 
providing illustrative content. 
From the list of factors that emerged, corruption was considered by most to play 
a central role in compromising Afghan security and law enforcement. Indeed, 






aspects of public administration. Corruption alone, however, cannot provide a 
complete explanation for everything that is wrong with security sustainability in 
Afghanistan. Reflecting the wickedness and messiness of the problem, corrup-
tion combines with other factors, creates secondary effects, and multiplies and 
propagates throughout the system under investigation until the system’s integrity 
is completely undermined.
Step Three: Specify the Primary Factors and Develop Conditions
A morphological array is formed by first selecting between five and seven aspects 
of an overall social field that the stakeholders regard as key; these are called 
primary factors. Then, under each factor, the participants list conditions that 
describe the worst possible state of that factor, the actual state, and the desired 
state, plus any plausible intermediate conditions. The software we used facilitates 
this process and sequences the condition statements for further analysis.15
Although the question may generate well over 100 relevant factors (see ap-
pendix 1), the method calls for as few as five but never more than seven primary 
factors to serve as the dimensions of analysis. These factors should correspond 
to the topics that one would cover in a brief description of the system that is 
being studied.16 To arrive at the primary factors, the Post-it Notes are laid out for 
everyone to see and then grouped by a process of consensus according to their 
general topic or issue (see appendix 2). Once the sorting and grouping is com-
plete, an overall title—the name of the factor—is assigned to each of the groups 
to capture the content embodied in that group. Often a single Post-it Note 
comment within a group conveys a meaningful title for that group. 
We now have our primary factors associated with Afghanistan’s security and law 
enforcement sustainability:
 ¡ Computing and information management systems
 ¡ Decision making
 ¡ Leadership
 ¡ Management
 ¡ Inter- and intra-agency relationships
 ¡ Capability objectives
 ¡ Integrity
Not only does this list of factors serve to guide the discussion of possible 
solutions, it will also provide a key reference framework against which to assess 
progress as improvements are implemented, and, importantly, will highlight the 
next logical factor to require our attention as we continually recalibrate condi-
tions within the system under study.
The participants then describe each of these primary factors with a range of 
conditions, from the most favorable to the least favorable. The team chooses a 
few condition descriptions that together offer a crisp and nicely discriminating 
illustration of the overall field conditions associated with the sustainment of 
Afghan law enforcement and national security. The resulting Zwicky box is 
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Also in this step, the team assigns a memorable acronym to the project by 
drawing out key letters from within the factors to create a word, or meta-
language, that captures the essence of the topic under investigation. As figure 1 
illustrates, we selected the word DIPLOMA from key letters within the seven 
factors. To create this word we also had to resequence the factors, a process that 
incidentally helps to discourage any arbitrary or inappropriate prioritization of 
one factor over another.
 
The creation of a factors-conditions array is central to the GMA process. It 
provides both a shared framework of agreed principal factors and specifies the 
range from the most favorable conditions to the least favorable for each factor. 
Step Four: Pairwise Comparison and Filtering
The 27 total conditions that accompany the seven factors (see table 1) present 
the possibility for 10,800 pair configurations (3 × 4 × 3 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 5), which 
is far too many to consider or analyze individually. There is, however, a smaller 
number of plausible configurations within this array that can be determined by 
filtering out all those that contain illogical or incoherent pairs. The purpose of 
this pairing exercise is to judge whether each pair of conditions, taken in turn, 
could coexist within a broader pattern describing Afghanistan’s security and law 
enforcement sustainability. To be plausible, participants should be able to say of 
each pair, I cannot visualize a situation where these two conditions would not exist 









































Absent Catatonic Cautiously 
engaged







Moribund Hostile and 
adversarial
Table 1: The Zwicky Box: A Factors-Conditions Array 













Figure 1: Creating an Acronym
February 2015
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The participants choose yes, no, or maybe to rate the viability of each pairing. 
A yes answer is fairly definite and not particularly helpful as far as reducing the 
total number of patterns goes; a no is the most important because it captures a 
group agreement that there was no internally consistent pattern in which the 
pair of conditions in question would fit; a maybe is ambiguous and confirms that 
the group has no strong opinions on whether to keep or reject this pair. 
To illustrate this further, the pattern D1I1P1L3O3M2A2, selected at random, would 
have to be scored as plausible within all of the 21 pairs below to survive this filter:
This pattern did not survive the filtering and was discarded because “prompt, in-
formed, and outcome-focused” decision making (D1) does not coincide with either 
“cautiously engaged” leadership (L3) or “confused” capability objectives (O3).
Any single pair that is deemed implausible removes the entire pattern from 
consideration. This filtering process across all condition pairs removes 10,667 
configurations, leaving a total of 137 that were considered internally consistent 
across all seven factors. The surviving patterns are listed in appendix 3. This set 
of 137 viable pairs will include the current condition and the desired condition 
for each factor, because they are bounded by (and may actually be) the best and 
worst conditions. In a later step, the remaining internally consistent configura-
tions will be sorted and strung together to form achievable and sequenced condi-
tion changes over time—a campaign plan.
Step Five: Current and Desired Conditions
The factors-conditions table allows stakeholders and planners to visualize both 
the precise specifications of the current and desired conditions and the gap or 
distance between the two. The current and desired conditions are shown in 
figure 2.
D1I1 [Decision making: prompt, informed, outcome-focused; Integrity: honest and virtuous] 
D1P1 I1P1  [comPuting and information systems: integrated, seamless, and ubiquitous] 
D1L3 I1L3 P1L3  [Leadership: cautiously engaged] 
D1O3 I1O3 P1O3 L3O3 [capability Objectives: confused] 
D1M2 I1M2 P1M2 L3M2 O3M2 [Management: measured] 
D1A2 I1A2 P1A2 L3A2 O3A2 M2A2 [inter- and intra-Agency relations: collaborative]
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Moribund Hostile and 
adversarial
Figure 2: Current (Left) and Desired (Right) Conditions
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As can be seen, six of the seven factors require the conditions to be reset by only 
one level; the factor capability objectives requires an improvement of two levels. 
This is encouraging, because it suggests that the system is almost where it needs 
to be. The fact that all seven areas demand attention, however, also highlights the 
chronic and systemic weaknesses that conspire to undermine performance.
Step Six: Developing the Campaign Plan
Starting with the 137 DIPLOMA configurations that survived our process of elimi-
nation in step 4, we first discard the 86 configurations that were worse than the 
current conditions and the seven that were beyond the intended end-state. This 
leaves us with 42 intermediate conditions—the product of the GMA process—
from which to build a campaign plan (see appendix 3).
Given the current conditions, we next ask the question: If we were to choose one 
factor to try to improve, which one is the most likely to show early improvement 
with the least effort? The stakeholders determine that inter- and intra-agency 
relationships (and the underpinning behaviors that affect them) must be reset 
from a condition of neutral to an improved condition of cooperative. Success in 
the agency factor will also be accompanied by a corresponding improvement 
in capability objectives from confused to ad hoc and partially shared. Figure 3 
illustrates these changes.
This process identifies the next pattern in the series—D2I2P2L3O2M2A3. This 
incremental improvement may also set the preconditions that make it possible 
to improve another condition: leadership may move from cautiously engaged to 
active, engaged, and aware. This process of step-by-step improvement continues 
until each factor achieves its desired condition. The process is illustrated in 
figure 4, which presents one preferred and some alternate courses of action. 
Starting from the current conditions at the bottom of the chart, we can choose 
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Figure 3: The Current Conditions and Sample Initial Lines of Operation
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to first improve either leadership (left solid branch, row 1) or capability objectives 
and relationships (right solid branch, row 1). Figure 4 shows that five steps are 
required to achieve the desired end-state, but there can be more than one way 
to get there. When faced with this set of choices at the outset, most viewers are 
likely to see leadership as being pivotal to any other improvements.
In previous exercises, this campaign planning/operational design stage has trig-
gered rich discussions of what can be made to happen and why. For example, it is 
not uncommon to hear a group member say something like, “A #112 pattern can’t 
come so soon after a #173!” where the numbers stand for whole configurations.
This orientation towards bringing about positive change is different from con-
ventional planning in that we are identifying what “we want to make happen,” 
rather than what “we are going to do,” or what means and resources we might 
use. In conventional military planning, the means are often predetermined by 
the commander or decision maker, and planning staff. The GMA planning pro-
cess, by contrast, continues through each incremental improvement until the 
factors reach their desired conditions (characterizing the optimum end-state), 
in this case, Afghan security forces that are reliable, capable, and sustainable.
Conclusion: Executing the Plan
More than most other analytical methods, the GMA process offers planners 
and officials a comprehensive and detailed appreciation of the wickedness and 
messiness of the problem with which they must grapple. It also makes clear 
that they must avoid superficiality in execution. Our area of interest, Afghan 
security, is capable of enormous variety, because of the nature of governance, 
communication, decision making, and other features common to Afghanistan’s 
public administration. Our solution set therefore must possess an equal or 
greater capacity for variety. 
The problem sustainability of law enforcement and national security in Af-
ghanistan can exhibit a variety of characteristics and behaviors. Ashby’s Law 
of Requisite Variety requires our instruments of national power and any other 
Figure 4: The Lines of Operation (DIPLOMA),  
with Sample Branches and Sequels
D I P L O M A1 2 31 111
D I P L O M A2 3 32 222D I P L O M A2 2 43 222
D I P L O M A1 2 31 111D I P L O M A2 2 32 222
D I P L O M A2 2 32 222
D I P L O M A2 2 32 212
D I P L O M A1 2 31 212















WHAT “WE ARE 
GOING TO DO.”
34
CTX | Vol. 5, No. 1
resources we may mobilize to possess a capacity for variety that is equal to or 
greater than our area of interest if we are to successfully shape and influence 
(reset) the existing conditions in a specified direction. 
Ashby’s Law originates within General Systems Theory and primarily concerns 
cybernetics—information and communications. The air in the room where 
you are reading this article, for example, can exhibit a variety of characteristics, 
including temperature, humidity, and pressure, to name a few. If you want to 
monitor and control these factors, then your thermostats, humidifiers, and 
other environment control devices must possess the functionality to first detect 
variation and then activate the appropriate corrections. In other words, these 
corrective measures must possess an equal or greater capacity for variety than the 
area of interest they seek to influence. 
What does this mean for sustainability? If we ignore, or fail to accommodate, the 
richness and diversity of conditions associated with sustainability in Afghani-
stan, along with all the less surprising but still unexpected events that may crop 
up, then we will experience continued disappointment, frustration, and lack of 
progress. The GMA process allows us to pool the knowledge and experience of 
experts and distill the aggregate into clear, accessible, realistic steps that, taken 
with an open mind and an eye to innovation, can lead to real and sustainable 
improvement. v
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Appendix 1: Factors Influencing Law Enforcement and National Security Sustainment
The following factors combine to influence the extent to which law enforcement and national security can be sustained. 
These were distilled into the seven primary factors.
Decision making
























Item codes and tracking
Proprietary logistics information 
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Appendix 2: Grouping of Factors
We grouped the original 67 factors into seven primary factors by placing the Post-it Notes on a wall and allowing the 




















































Appendix 3: Surviving Configurations 
The following list shows the configurations that remained after we removed all configurations that contained one or 
more illogical pairs, and those that lay outside the limits of the current and desired conditions. The current conditions are 
marked with (C), the desired conditions are marked with (D), and the intermediate conditions to get from the current to 
the desired are numbered. 




































44. D2I2P2L2O2M2A3   (#2)




49. D2I2P2L3O2M2A3  (#1)
50. D2I2P2L3O2M3A4
51. D2I2P2L3O3M2A4  (C)
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Understanding the Intensity of Boko  
Haram’s Terrorism
Muhammad Feyyaz, University of 
Management and Technology
Few militant organizations have gained global prominence as 
rapidly as Boko Haram (BH), owing to its characteristically unrestrained violence. 
Research on BH has therefore bourgeoned equally quickly. The Nigerian govern-
ment, with support from regional states and the international community, has 
likewise increased its engagement in counterterrorism activities, but the violence 
nevertheless persists. Two conspicuous undercurrents characterize the prevailing 
conditions in the country. First, most research is focused on ways to resolve the 
conflict, which is a long-term project.1 Second, the state’s efforts are directed 
toward elimination of the violence by primarily military means.2 The result has 
been further aggression by BH and an increase in the appeal of its jihadist message, 
especially for youth. The fluidity of the situation on the ground, however, reveals 
that this is not a case for conflict resolution, nor can it be fixed by the impulsive 
and somewhat symptomatic approach adopted by the government. To create 
the space for other response strategies to take effect, the first requirements are to 
understand the situation and manage the spiral of violence. This study seeks to 
demystify the phenomenology of Boko Haram’s escalating violence and provide 
some clarity on a relatively unexplored aspect of Nigeria’s nascent civil war. 
My primary argument is that the prevailing security conditions in northern 
Nigeria reflect a dynamic rooted in both the unbridled revenge killings of BH 
members and their affiliates by the state security apparatus and vigilante groups, 
and the militants’ campaign of extremist religious violence against the state 
and society. There is a direct and causal correlation between Nigeria’s political 
developments and the escalating sectarian violence, a correlation that has been 
underresearched and therefore remains the least understood dimension of Ni-
geria’s conflict. This assertion challenges previous explanations, including those 
that link outbreaks of violence by Boko Haram directly to President Goodluck 
Jonathan’s election in 2011 and his reelection bid in the upcoming February 2015 
election.3 In my view, however, politics alone cannot fully explain the chronic 
nature of the problem, because even if power returns to the north—Boko Ha-
ram’s base—in the future, the violence will very likely persist owing to a deeply 
entrenched, structural hatred of elites that permeates the ranks of BH. 
This study begins with a brief history of Boko Haram’s violence. I then try to 
make sense of the mayhem by identifying possible patterns, cycles, and trends 
in the violence through an analysis of data covering the period from 1 October 
2010 to 15 June 2014. The analytical framework examines four concepts that 
researchers have proposed to understand Nigeria’s situation: variability in the 
threshold of violence, time series, routine activity theory, and political develop-
ments. The time series encompasses trend analysis (the long-term movement in a 
series), cycles that are regular nonseasonal fluctuations, and seasonality (days of 
the week as well as time of the year).4 The seasonality component is drawn from 
routine activity theory. I first tested these three time-series elements to identify 
any peaks and patterns in the violence, and then analyzed the results in relation 
to major political developments to determine whether verifiable political triggers 
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The Pathway and Profile of Violence 
The exact origins of BH remain largely in doubt. The available records suggest 
that Mohammed Yusuf founded BH in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the 
goal of establishing shari’a government in Borno State in northern Nigeria.6 
Prior to this, the group has been traced back as far as 1995, when it existed as a 
little-known Muslim youth organization called Shabaab, under the leadership of 
a cleric known as Abubakar Lawan.7 The command later shifted to Yusuf when 
Lawan departed for studies in Saudi Arabia. Yusuf ’s charm and religious appeal 
were instrumental in attracting wider swaths of the region’s youth, who were 
disillusioned by their socioeconomic miseries.8 In fact, many poor families and 
unemployed youths from the neighboring countries of Niger, Chad, and Cam-
eroon also enrolled in Yusuf ’s religious complex, which included a mosque and 
a school that offered primarily ideological studies.9 Those who interacted with 
Yusuf have quoted him as saying that his goal was the establishment of an Islamic 
state “in Nigeria, and if possible all over the world, but through dialogue.” In 
January 2006, the imam was teaching approximately 3,000 students.10 
It is unclear what motivated Yusuf to espouse violence; there is, however, a gen-
eral consensus among independent observers that violent clashes between Chris-
tians and Muslims and harsh government treatment, including pervasive police 
brutality, encouraged the group to radicalize.11 The first known attack by BH was 
carried out in December 2003 by roughly 200 militants, who struck multiple 
police stations in the state of Yobe, near the Niger border.12 As the sphere of 
its activities spread to neighboring states, BH caught the attention of Nigeria’s 
political leadership, who authorized military deployments against the group. 
After a major showdown with the military in July 2009, in which approximately 
800 to 900 militants were killed, Yusuf was captured and died in police custody 
on 30 July.13 His followers regarded this as an extrajudicial killing, although the 
police claimed that he died trying to escape.14 State television footage shown to 
officials and journalists revealed jubilant police celebrating around his body. For 
rights activists and observers, “the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf in police custody 
[was] a shocking example of the brazen contempt by the Nigerian police for the 
rule of law.”15
The 2009 massacre by the security agencies raised such alarm that the govern-
ment ordered the prosecution not only of the police personnel who killed Yusuf 
but also the military commander of a unit that killed 42 other BH insurgents.16 
The carnage, however, also marked the beginning of an organized, violent 
antistate terror campaign by BH. Over time, the group reevaluated its definition 
of the “legitimate” enemy and expanded its attacks beyond drive-by shootings 
of off-duty security officers to targeting local politicians, traditional authority 
figures, and Christian and eventually even Muslim civilians.17 Attacks by the 
group increased in frequency, reach, and destructiveness, especially from May 
2011 onward.18 The most dramatic development came when BH began to use 
suicide bombers, starting with an attack on the Nigerian Police Force Headquar-
ters in Abuja on 16 June 2011, which was followed by a car bombing at the UN 
headquarters, also in Abuja, on 26 August 2011.19 
Over the next two years, the violence rose to alarming levels, with attacks oc-
curring on an almost daily basis in the northern part of the country. Some days, 
fatalities exceeded 100, a pattern that has continued ever since. For example, 




















Figure 1: Total Fatalities by Year
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states.20 BH’s most deadly single assault came in January 2012 when coordinated 
bomb and gun attacks in Kano City killed an estimated 185 people (the number 
claimed by BH).21 Similarly, on 17 September 2013, BH gunmen killed 142 people 
and burned dozens of homes in coordinated attacks on the town of Benisheikh 
in Borno State.22 The year 2014 was unprecedented for the intensity of the group’s 
violence. Approximately 3,300 people, the majority of whom were civilians, died 
violently in different locations across northeast Nigeria during the first six months 
of the year alone. More than half of the killings were carried out by members 
of BH, whose victims included scores of schoolchildren who were deliberately 
targeted by the group. The rest were killed by security forces during fighting or 
in retaliation for Boko Haram’s depredations.23 Hundreds of soldiers, members 
of the Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) militia, and suspected BH fighters have also 
been killed in attacks and clashes in the conflict.24 The levels of violence in 2014 
prompted Amnesty International to classify Nigeria’s fighting as a noninterna-
tional armed conflict.25 
These descriptions provide only a fractional view of the human tragedy suffered 
in Nigeria since the advent of BH-related violence.26 The death toll between 
2001 and 2013 has been estimated at 10,000, with the greatest number by far 
coming since 2009.27 Although the estimates of total fatalities vary widely, 
between 2009 and 2013, this militant group alone was responsible for 2.34 per-
cent of the more than 34,000 terrorist attacks that took place worldwide and 
caused 5.9 percent of fatalities.28 Headed by Abubakar Shekau since 2010, Boko 
Haram is now considered among the deadliest extremist groups in the world.29
Annual Violence Threshold Variability 
A total of 6,634 Nigerian civilians and security personnel (excluding the mili-
tary) lost their lives in 397 violent incidents between 2010 and 2014, the period 
of this study (see figure 1). The intensity of the violence has been on an upward 
trend with each succeeding year, registering a threefold rise in the annual number 
of fatalities. In 2011, violence by BH was largely confined to Nigeria’s northeast; 
by the end of 2012, it had engulfed 14 out of the country’s 36 states, including 
all 12 of the states that have already adopted Islamic law and the Federal Capital 
Territory of Abuja.30 Nineteen hundred people died in BH violence during 2013; 
the group was responsible for an average of 12.42 reported fatalities per conflict 
event (compared to two per event by Somalia’s Al Shabaab in 2013).31 In the first 
half of 2014, violence reached an unprecedented level. Informed opinions about 
the causes of this increased intensity in BH’s terrorist activity are scant, and those 
who study it generally focus on the highhandedness of the Nigerian military and 
law enforcement agencies, without relating the violence to situational dynamics.
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a research group 
that focuses on violence on the African continent, attributes this 
rise in the trajectory of violence to an alteration in Boko Haram’s 
targeting strategy, that is, toward the discrete use of violence against 
noncombatants. ACLED posits that such attacks were almost entirely 
absent from the 2010 data, suggesting that 2011 marked an impor-
tant turning point in the development of the group and its strategic 
and deliberate use of violence against civilians. According to ACLED, 
this was particularly noticeable in 2012, when high-intensity attacks 
on noncombatants outweighed clashes with security forces (see 
figure 2; the yellow dots represent civilian casualties).33 The tally 
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Figure 3: Quarterly Casualties in Nigeria’s Conflict with Boko Haram
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in figure 1 supports ACLED’s finding of an increase in 
violent fatalities since 2011. 
Both of these figures, however, provide only a symptom-
atic picture and do not offer a rationale for the factors 
propelling the change. For example, each single year 
in figure 1 represents a cycle; when each year is broken 
into quarters, the cycle of violence even within one year 
appears random (figure 3). Nor is the assertion by ACLED 
that there has been a surge in attacks against civilians 
statistically substantiated. A closer scrutiny of the data 
reveals that, other than those who died in attacks on a 
pub and two churches in December 2011 and who were 
mostly Christians, the majority of BH’s victims were 
collateral and politically engaged, such as Muslim clerics 
or suspected government collaborators. There were two 
or three instances of deliberate attacks in public places 
that resulted in relatively few deaths, possibly carried out simply to induce fear.35 
Aside from those instances, there is no evidence that over the course of 2011, BH 
regularly engaged civilian targets. While it is clear from the evidence that civil-
ians became part of BH’s conflict strategy beginning in 2011, the erratic violence 
by the group indicates that its behavior was provoked by extrasystemic triggers. 
This is a vital aspect to understanding the phenomenology of Nigeria’s violence. 
Routine Activity and Seasonal Variation
Many scholars have attributed a noticeable increase in crime during the summer 
months to the greater availability of outdoor victims due to good weather and 
longer daytime hours. By implication, they endorse routine activity theory by 
suggesting a correlation between the summer months and the first few days 
of the week, when there may be more opportunities to strike.37 Nigeria has a 
tropical climate with abundant sunshine throughout the year; in the country’s 
northern part, the weather is hot and dry most of the year, with temperatures 
climbing as high as 40 C (104 F), and the rainy season lasts for only three to 
four months ( June–September). The country’s general terrain is low grassland 
without significant obstacles to movement. To what extent, then, do climatic 
seasonality and topography contribute to Nigeria’s patterns of violent activity?  
As shown in figure 4, the incidence line for violent activity in Nigeria steadily 



















































































Figure 5: Stability and Escalation Trend  
across Months
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rises again until June. A curve begins to form from June onward, which reaches 
another apex in October. The remaining two months of the year witness substan-
tially less violence compared to earlier months. Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate that 
overall the event distribution is nonsymmetrical, whereas the central tendency of 
the incidence of violence across months is stable at a certain level. This hori-
zontal leveling of occurrences is illustrated by the general trend line in figure 5 
and implies that the level of violence has stabilized over time, despite occasional 
extremes in which the number of incidents rises above 40 or falls below 21. The 
relative stability of the mean level of violence can be interpreted as BH’s intent to 
maintain its visibility, while the unusual escalations or reductions may show the 
group’s willingness to match violence against them with more violence, as dictated 
by a circumstantial dynamic. This observation strengthens the underlying notion 
that there is a regulated nature to Nigeria’s violence, consistent with 
a trigger. The relationship between continuity and magnitude is also 
robust; therefore, the histogram in figure 5 infers the persistence of 
this trend into the future. 
To see whether fluctuations in the trend line of figure 4 are the 
result of a circumstantial dynamic, the potential impact of climate 
on the operational scale of violence should be examined. Local 
meteorologists have concluded that the expected frequency and 
intensity of climatic hazards due to climate change in urban areas 
can no longer be predicted by relying solely on historical data, local 
experiences, and institutional memory. Through empirical analysis, 
they have found instead an increased likelihood of unpredictability 
in climatic conditions.40 When considering the June–October 
curve in Figure 4, this finding means that climate has no significant 
effect on the overall level of violence. For example, other than a 
quiet July during 2011 or low-key violence in August and September 
of 2012, the rainy months have not seen any notable decline in 
terrorist activity. Similarly, the timing of violence does not seem 
to have been influenced by high floods.41 In fact, while Kano State 
was experiencing devastating floods during July 2012, violent acts 
were considerably curtailed there but concomitantly, more targets 
were hit in the states of Borno, Yobe, and Bauchi, and in Abuja.42 While it seems 
clear that climate and topography do not hinder violence, this inference does not 
explain the dip in violent attacks that occurs during April or the peaks during 
February, March, June, and October. 
Temporal Seasonality Trend and Patterns
Nigeria observes nearly two dozen annual public holidays as a result of its 
sociocultural and religious diversity. The country follows the common five-day 
workweek with a two-day weekend. Friday, which is generally observed as a 
weekend day in many Muslim countries, is a working day in Nigeria. As in 
other countries, each day of the week in Nigeria has some cultural, mystic, or 
mythological significance. But it can be assumed that these rituals do not mean 
anything to a terrorist organization, for whom opportunity and the availability 
of targets should take precedence over everything else.
Figure 6 depicts violent episodes according to historical data across the days of 
the week. The figure shows a single peak in violence on Sunday, with Tuesday, 
Thursday, and Fridays sharing an identical plane. As shown, the event record 
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Days of week 1974-2007 2009-2012
World Pakistan Pakistan 
Monday 15.36(1) 19.90(1) 19.39(2)
Tuesday 14.05(5) 12.10(6) 11.56(6)
Wednesday 15.22(2) 14.11(4) 14.62(5)
Thursday 15.06(3) 12.67(5) 21.77(1)
Friday 14.91(4) 11.34(7) 17.35(3)
Saturday 12.49(7) 14.52(3) 15.30(4)
Sunday 12.92(6) 15.36(2) 11.56(6)
Table 1: Incidents of Terrorism Globally and in Pakistan,  

























Figure 6: Distribution of Violence Across the Week
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does not produce a coherent pattern; consistency in the prevalence of 
violence across the week is the only observable trend. 
How does Nigeria’s situation compare with terrorism trends across re-
gions? Two data sets that track incidents of terrorism across the days of 
the week reveal some interesting insights. The first covers terrorist events 
throughout the world over a period of 34 years (1974 to 2007), while 
the second shows prevailing security conditions in Pakistan between 
2009 and 2012 (see table 1). Monday shows up as the key day for acts 
of terrorism in both data sets. One common explanation for this is that private 
citizens and government institutions—the preferred targets for acts of political ter-
rorism—are less available on the weekend, so terrorists simply wait until Monday 
to attack.44 Consequently, Saturdays and Sundays are the least active worldwide.45 
Unlike the rest of the world, however, most terrorist attacks in Pakistan were 
carried out on Thursday, followed by Monday and Friday. In Pakistan, Thursday 
is traditionally the day on which large numbers of people go to shrines, while 
Fridays are set aside for prayers and religious observance. These days are therefore 
rational choices for terrorists who wish to produce mass casualties. The incidence 
profile reveals that Friday, far from being a day of peace, is an important day to 
hit a larger number of human beings at prayer time, perhaps in part because the 
terrorists imagine they will receive divine providence by attacking those they 
regard as apostate on the holy day.47 In more recent years, even this trend has 
tended to fluctuate according to the ideology of the terrorist group involved.
How does this pattern hold up for Nigeria? Over the last four years, churches 
were attacked by militants on more than 30 of a total 209 Sundays. It would 
be logical to expect the same trend for attacks against Muslims during Friday 
congregations. On a single Friday in December 2011, a BH bombing and shooting 
attack killed four Muslim worshippers in Maiduguri as they were leaving the 
mosque after attending Friday prayers. This attack, however, was directed pri-
marily against a nearby military checkpoint, not the mosque. Likewise, coordi-
nated strikes that killed at least 185, including 29 policemen, after Friday prayers 
on 20 January 2012 in Kano, a predominantly Muslim city, targeted the police 
headquarters.48 On two occasions, Christians were also attacked on a Friday,49 
while unarmed Muslim village communities were targeted by BH at least 35 times 
on Sundays across large swaths of the country. 
The spread of these attacks reveals indiscriminate targeting of civilians by Boko 
Haram, regardless of the victims’ religious beliefs. Another distinction is that 
in Nigeria, terrorist activity tends to be low on Monday but much higher on 
FRIDAY IS AN IM-
PORTANT DAY 






Tuesday. This is the opposite of the trend both globally and in Pakistan, where 
Mondays attract greater terrorist activity compared with Tuesdays. 50
The Linkages between Political Developments and 
Violence
The theory that the intensity of Boko Haram’s violence can best be explained 
in terms of a political feud is premised primarily on the argument that, while 
the extrajudicial killing of the leadership of the BH in 2009 may have triggered 
a violent confrontation with the state, the more recent severity of violence 
is the fallout of a fierce political battle in April 2011 that brought Goodluck 
Jonathan—a southern Christian member of the powerful People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP)—to power.51 The question is whether this political dynamic can be 
clearly linked with the contemporary security landscape. In Nigeria, national 
elections are a two-stage process: the presidential poll is followed by elections 
for state governors. It is intriguing to note that the north, which was gripped by 
devastating riots in the days after Jonathan’s election in what looked like histor-
ical north-south animosity, just a short time later returned numerous incumbent 
PDP governors to office. The PDP basically held its ground in the north despite 
the opposition.52 Nigerian analysts have suggested that northern Nigerians tend 
to make different calculations regarding their interests at the national level than 
they do at the state and local levels, implying that they are strategic in their 
approach. These analysts further warn that outsiders who analyze local politics 
need to understand the different frames of reference that people shift between 
when making political decisions, and to consider the different priorities that 
people try to balance.53 In this light, the May 2011 unrest appears unlikely to be 
directly connected to the agenda of the insurgency. 
Similarly, some speculate that BH was a creation of some disgruntled members 
of President Jonathan’s ruling party, who appropriated the group to destabilize 
his government.54 President Jonathan himself has conceded that BH backers 
and sympathizers are “in the executive arm of the government; some of them 
are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of the government, while some are even 
in the legislative arm. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other 
security agencies.”55 While the motivations of alleged supporters warrant close 
study, their activities on behalf of the rebels are unlikely to be of any serious 
consequence compared to other strategic developments that have produced and 
animated the conflict environment.
On 31 December 2011, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in parts 
of Borno, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe states after a Christmas Day bomb attack by 
BH on Saint Theresa Catholic Church in the town of Madalla near Abuja, which 
killed 42 worshippers. On 2 January 2012, BH issued a three-day ultimatum 
to southern Nigerians to leave the north. The group then carried out a series 
of attacks on Christians and churches after the deadline passed.56 In a video 
message posted online later that month, BH leader Shekau stated, “Everyone has 
seen what the security personnel have done to us. Everyone has seen why we are 
fighting with them,”57 apparently referring to abuses by the special military task 
force that was set up by the federal government in June 2011 in Maiduguri and 
the deployment of hundreds of soldiers in Borno State in October 2011.58 
With the imposition of emergency rule at the end of 2011, it appeared that the 
floodgates of violence were opened. BH carried out more attacks and killed 
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more people during the six months of the emergency than in all of 2010 and 2011 
combined.59 The coordinated bombing and gun battle against police headquarters 
in Kano on 20 January 2012 was one of the deadliest attacks by BH during 2012. 
A message from the BH on 1 February 2012 asking Kano residents to bear with 
the violence, in an apparent bid to show people that the sect was only trying to 
target the government, proved to be a farce. Civilians clearly were targeted in this 
period: BH carried out 31 attacks against Christians and churches; 43 against 
Muslim clerics, mosques, and communities; and nearly a dozen against foreigners. 
Even so, the police and military, who suffered over 80 attacks, remained the 
group’s principal focus. BH had warned in March 2012 that “all police stations 
and other security outfits are our targets.”60 In the most horrific incident, in 
October 2012, BH operatives slit the throats of 26 people in a student housing 
area in Mubi town, in the state of Adamawa, bordering Cameroon. It is believed 
that the group’s attacks against police officers, Christians, and Muslims in 2012 
involved those who allegedly cooperated with the government or opposed BH.61
The year 2013 was especially notable because of the advent of what was, es-
sentially, a state of civil war in northern Nigeria. Africa analyst Jacob Zenn 
suggested that the French-led military intervention in northern Mali in January 
2013 may have indirectly revitalized BH. His comment was inspired by attacks 
along northeastern Borno’s borders with Niger and Cameroon from March to 
May 2013, which were thought to be the work of former members of Ansaru, BH, 
and other militant groups, who had fought with or learned from the rebels in 
Mali.62 The fact that Nigeria had been wracked by instability prior to the Malian 
crisis does not, however, lend credence to this hypothesis. The dynamics of the 
rising violence were essentially informed and shaped by domestic concerns. 
The Civilian Joint Task Force 
On 14 May 2013, President Jonathan again declared a state of emergency in the 
three northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa to curtail 
the activities of BH. This decree was followed by increased militarization of the 
troubled zones.63 A spate of kidnapings by BH began in May 2013; BH leader 
Shekau announced in a video that these were retaliation for Nigerian security 
forces’ taking the wives and children of group members.64 Both conflict events 
and reported fatalities increased dramatically in that month.65 In June, President 
Jonathan declared BH and the splinter group Ansaru to be terrorist organiza-
tions, and imposed a 20-year jail sentence for their noncombatant supporters.66 
The defining marker in the general escalation of violence, however, was the 
formation of a state-sanctioned militia called the Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF), 
also in May 2013. This group of loosely coordinated civilians was given powers to 
arrest suspected BH members and hand them over to the security forces.67 Not 
only did the Borno state government hail the role being played by the Civilian 
JTF, but the president himself hailed the youth vigilantes as “new national 
heroes.”68 Much encouraged and supported by the military, police, and society, 
this group of young fighters seemed to many to be a harbinger of positive change 
in Nigeria’s precarious internal security situation. In reality, however, this armed 
civil resistance formation incited BH into direct confrontation with the general 
population. Concurrently with the Civilian JTF, unsanctioned vigilante groups 
emerged in rural communities to oppose the terrorists.69 In turn, BH became 
intensely vengeful against the vigilante groups, plunging the country into a de 
facto civil war.70 Vigilantism is also displacing the government from its constitu-











Another crucial episode that distinguished this violent year was the custodial 
deaths of more than 950 members of BH in detention facilities run by the 
military JTF (formed by the government in 2011) in the first six months of 2013 
alone. Amnesty International claimed that prisoners were suffocated, starved, 
and arbitrarily executed in the army-led operation in the country’s northeast. 
At least 622 suspected BH collaborators were killed by the security forces on 
14 March 2014.71 On that same day, BH militants attacked Giwa barracks in 
Maiduguri and freed hundreds of detainees, but, remarkably, no soldiers were 
reported to have died in the attack. In contrast, the soldiers who regained con-
trol of the barracks after a few hours killed more than 600 people, mainly newly 
freed detainees, after the fighting had ended.72 When seen through the lens of 
an attack-retaliation feedback loop, the nonlinearity of the violence thresholds 
in the latter half of 2013 and in 2014, against law enforcement agencies but more 
specifically against civilians, is at once illuminated. This backdrop helps explain 
the rationale underlying BH’s escalating punitive rampage—the group has often 
cited security forces’ abuses to justify its attacks.73 Breaking into jails, deten-
tion cells, and barracks to free prisoners, sometimes on a very large scale, has 
remained one of BH’s signature activities over the years.  
Elusive Peace 
Peace overtures that had been initiated in August 2011 continued into 2013. The 
history of such efforts, however, whether by the militants or on behalf of the 
government, has been one of enigma and controversy. For example, there are con-
flicting reports about talks held by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo 
with BH in September 2011. IRIN, a news service formerly under the auspices 
of the UN, reported that none of the demands submitted by BH to President 
Jonathan on 16 September 2011 were heeded, despite the fact that the militants 
appeared to be offering a ceasefire. These demands also included an end to the 
arrests and killings of BH members, payment of compensation to the families 
of sect members killed by security personnel, and prosecution of the policemen 
responsible for the death of the group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in June 2009.74 
Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah, two leading writers on Nigerian security, 
nevertheless seem to refute the idea that BH would offer to participate in such 
negotiations, noting that “even an attempt by Nigeria’s ex-president, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, to broker peace with the group through some family members of the 
slain BH leader Mohammed Yusuf was rebuffed by the sect.”75 Similarly, the fate 
of recommendations, including amnesty, by a fact-finding committee instituted 
by the federal government in 2011 and headed by Ambassador Usman Gaji 
Galtimari, is not known. BH has chosen to maintain a vengeful stance in retalia-
tion for the slaying of Yusuf.76 
The intransigence does not lie entirely with Boko Haram, however. The amnesty 
buzzword has been heard repeatedly in discussions of how to deal with BH 
up until the present time, but to no avail. Between March and August 2013, 
there were several botched attempts by the government to bring peace.77 In one 
instance, President Jonathan openly rejected calls for an amnesty deal for BH 
during a visit to Damaturu in March. In April 2013, the government convened 
a 26-member Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security 
Challenges in the North, with a three-month mandate to try to convince BH to 
lay down its arms in exchange for a state pardon and social integration.78 In June, 
however, the president raised the stakes again by designating BH a terrorist or-
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panel to initiate talks with BH, but in the same month, Nigeria’s minister of 
special duties announced he was in ceasefire negotiations with the Islamist insur-
gents, a claim which was promptly denied by BH.79 The government was reported 
to have rejected or discontinued negotiations with BH during the month of 
August. Other facilitators who tried to mediate between the two sides eventu-
ally pulled out of the process, citing insincerity on the part of the government 
or because BH accused the Nigerian state of bad faith.80 Similarly mixed signals 
radiated from the government during 2014. On 30 May, President Jonathan 
offered conditional amnesty to BH, while almost simultaneously ordering total 
war against the organization, seeming to justify accusations by BH that govern-
ment peace offers were insincere.81 Boko Haram, meanwhile, has stuck with its 
demands for the release of all the BH members being held in various prisons for 
acts of terrorism, as a condition for dialogue with the government.82 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This article proposes that a cause-and-effect feedback loop, exacerbated by poorly 
conceived political interventions, is behind the prevailing security breakdown 
in Nigeria. This is a dynamic that has not previously been investigated with due 
scientific rigor. A careful analysis of available data supports the hypothesis that 
Nigeria’s government and Boko Haram are trapped in an upward spiral of attack 
and retaliation that neither seems willing to break and that the principal under-
lying cause lies in the country’s political dynamics. 
Generally, the anatomy of Nigeria’s violence suggests that the country presents a 
unique context in which BH is pursuing a deliberate path of retributive punish-
ment. This strategy seems to have materialized from, and is sustained by, the 
memory of the 2009 massacre that its leadership and cadres suffered at the hands 
of the state security forces. BH can thus be understood as a traumatized militant 
structure that will continue with its violence as long as it perceives that justice is 
being denied. 
The data also make clear that climate hazards and topographical configurations 
have no correlation with terrorism within the Nigerian context. Likewise, tem-
poral seasonality with regard to the availability of targets is generally inapplicable 
with the exception of Sundays, which call for strong protective measures espe-
cially for the larger places of worship. The reason Christians are being discrimi-
nated against by BH appears to be a function more of politics and other events in 
the recent past than of the ideological leanings of BH. Muslims and Christians 
had peacefully coexisted in Nigeria for ages until increasingly severe economic 
inequality and corruption in recent decades spurred interfaith violence. 
Like Sundays, Tuesdays appear to be a favored day for attacks on urban centers, 
but terrorist strikes against urban communities, rural areas, and the border re-
gions of Nigeria have occurred on every day of the week.83 Temporal seasonality 
alone also fails to explain the monthly fluctuations in violence (i.e., a dip during 
April and peaks of violence during February, March, June, and October). When 
juxtaposed with political developments, however, these discontinuities not only 
become intelligible but reveal distinct dynamics that feed the cycles of violence. 
First, there appears to be a direct and strong correlation between the declaration 
of an emergency and an escalation in violence. Three dynamics in particular 
transformed the existing environment each time an emergency was imposed: the 
deployment of military contingents, the indiscriminate use of lethal force, and 
extrajudicial (summary) executions. In effect, an organization like Boko Haram, 
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with a history of trauma inflicted by the security establishment, is likely to regard 
the display of state symbols of power as a deliberate attempt at intimidation, 
which then obligates violent retribution. This finding rationalizes and places in 
perspective the assertion by ACLED that 2011 marks an important turning point 
in the development of the group and its strategic and deliberate use of violence 
against civilians. Military operations also have an implicit but strong associa-
tion with the militants’ rescue raids on prisoners’ housing. Metaphorically, 
prisoners act as a magnet for action and should be understood as a major point 
of sensitivity for BH, regardless of the location and the cost that may ensue from 
attempted rescues. It can be safely predicted that this trend will continue. 
Second, the analysis suggests a subtle linkage between the timing of the an-
nouncement of a state of emergency and Boko Haram’s selection of a type of 
target. The president’s first promulgation of an emergency came soon after BH’s 
Christmas Day bomb attack on a Catholic church. The decree denounced the 
attack as religiously motivated, and BH responded by warning all southerners 
(mainly Christians) to leave Borno State. The frequent killing of Christians on 
Sundays during 2012 makes sense when viewed against this backdrop. Unlike 
most terrorist groups, for which military considerations (i.e., the opportunity 
and availability of targets) generally dictate their targeting strategy, BH appears 
to be driven more by politics and circumstance.    
Another vivid dynamic correlating with the increased intensity of violence has 
been the deployment of vigilante groups since May 2013, a move that eroded 
the distinction between noncombatants and armed groups. State-sanctioned 
vigilantism enlarged BH’s targeting scope to include more civilians. An indirect 
effect of this development has been the expanding culture of violence in the 
country, with a corresponding dilution of the rule of law and government writ 
large. The designation of BH as a terrorist organization during May 2013 also 
served to heighten the mayhem. 
Finally, BH has offered no actionable response to peace overtures initiated by 
the state and private agencies, which indicates the pervasive mistrust among the 
parties. There also appears to be widespread confusion in the state’s counterter-
rorism strategy, which is often characterized by incomprehensible backtracking 
and contradictions. More than lack of imagination and will, this incoherence 
reflects the lack of a structured state or public narrative to deal with BH, 
which appears to be more adept at strategic communication than the Jonathan 
government. 
A meaningful policy response will have to isolate and disrupt these dynamics, 
if it is to break the cycle of retributive violence. A list that prioritizes the most 
essential dynamics to calm the violence must include the immediate disband-
ment and disarming of vigilante groups; revision of the rules of engagement 
for state security forces, with the aim to preserve life, coupled with stringent 
accountability measures; and reform of the criminal justice system so that it is 
transparent and upholds the ideals of the rule of law. In this regard, the release 
of prisoners who are being held illegally should be considered as a moral gesture. 
Muslim soldiers and police personnel involved in unlawful killings should be 
tried in the shari’a courts, with an emphasis on the “life for life” precept of Islam. 
The mitigation of hatred is a time-consuming process that calls for a national 
effort. Two initial measures are essential. First, the state needs to institute a 
reconciliation program that follows five stages: (1) the conception, design, and 
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organization of a plan; (2) a nationwide awareness campaign; (3) implementa-
tion of the plan; (4) both an in-process and post-reconciliation process review 
and assessment; and (5) the initiation of midcourse corrections or a reform 
agenda.84 In order to actualize such a program, the state must develop its own 
peace narrative, one driven by a philosophy of concordance that politically 
accepts the existence of the opposing side and attempts to incorporate it into the 
national mainstream. An effective peace narrative should revolve around mutual 
respect, trust, right to life, and a sense of reconciliation rather than retributive 
justice, while avoiding the use of security rhetoric. Second, and to immediately 
place the process on a sound footing, it would be worth contemplating an 
official acknowledgment of regret, short of an apology, for the unlawful killings 
by security forces. Whether the state should make concessions to an organiza-
tion labeled as terrorist at home and globally is a predicament, but one that will 
have to be resolved through dialogue between state and society to avoid further 
human loss. None of these suggestions will work unless they are accompanied by 
the institutionalization of anti-intimidation strategies, such as enhanced public 
diplomacy that explains the rationale behind security force deployments, along 
with the commitment to withdraw forces upon the cessation of violence, appeals 
for civil-military cooperation, better training for soldiers that promotes civil 
communication, and so on. 
Bringing an end to Nigeria’s violence calls for major policy reorientations. To 
preserve the lives of its citizenry despite internal divisions and conflict, a state is 
expected not only to ensure security, but to preserve the trust of its people, upon 
whom it depends for its vibrancy. The policy response in Nigeria in particular 
demands a sense of urgency and the will to act at all levels, lest the country 
plunge deeper into a civil war of dangerous proportions. v
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Robert Nickelsberg, Time photojournalist Interviewed by Dr. Leo Blanken, US Naval Postgraduate School
This interview is taken from the collection of the Com-
bating Terrorism Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 16 October 2014, Dr. Leo 
Blanken spoke with photojournalist Robert Nickelsberg about Nickels-
berg’s experiences over the past three decades working for Time magazine 
and the New York Times. Specializing in cultural and political change and 
upheaval, Nickelsberg has covered events across Asia and the Middle East.2 
His book, Afghanistan: A Distant War (Prestel USA, 2013), received the 
Olivier Rebbot Award from the Overseas Press Club for the best reporting 
from abroad in books and magazines.
LEO BLANKEN: Robert Nickelsberg, we’re glad to have you here at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. We would like to talk to you about your career 
and some of the things that you’ve done in the course of your work, and 
also how your work relates to our missions of defense analysis and special 
operations in areas of conflict, in which you have a lot of experience. First 
of all, how did you arrive where you are professionally?
ROBERT NICKELSBERG: Well, thank you for inviting me here. I started 
my career as a contract photographer with Time magazine in Central 
America in the early 1980s. After that, I moved to South America and 
then over to Southeast Asia for a few years, from 1985 to 1987. At the end 
of 1987, I moved to New Delhi, India, where Time magazine had a bureau. 
From there, I covered the geographic region of South Asia: Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, and occasionally Bhutan—es-
sentially from the Himalayas down to the Indian Ocean. At the time, the Soviet 
Army had already been in Afghanistan for close to 10 years, and when I moved 
there, they had agreed to an exit plan. So I found the region at that very moment 
to be incredibly interesting. I was on a very steep learning curve at first, trying 
to understand not only the political dynamics but also the cultural differences 
and anomalies in South Asia, given the large number of countries, cultures, and 
religions, and the history there. Particularly with the end of the Cold War hap-
pening right in front of me, I had to get a grip on things fast—not just the local 
politics, but regional events as well. 
BLANKEN: How do you see your profession as a photographer who is also 
dealing with the issues of conflict, politics, and so on? How do you see your role 
in observing these conflicts?
NICKELSBERG: I look at it as informed documentary style. I deal with informa-
tion, timing, location, and the political and cultural environment that I put 
myself in. I volunteered for these locations—it’s a good thing for me that they 
were available. I worked with writers at Time magazine and the New York Times, 
which are text-driven publications. These in-depth feature articles tend to come 
out of volatile areas, or where things are happening very spontaneously outside 
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the rule of law, which generally is something that I am at-
tracted to. The news also tends to follow these fast-breaking 
stories. But given the technology at the time, particularly in 
the 1980s and 1990s, my work was very manually driven. I 
had to physically deliver film to the airport or to a customs 
broker or somewhere, a necessity very unfamiliar to the 
present generation with its digital photography. So I had a 
lot of things to juggle, and I had to learn very quickly about 
what I was putting in front of my camera. I became an 
informed observer. 
BLANKEN: As opposed to a law enforcement officer or 
even a soldier, in a lot of ways you not only have deep 
access to one conflict, but you also have the opportunity 
to observe many different types of situations and forms of 
conflict. I have noticed this in the breadth of your work, 
not only spatially but also temporally. For example, you 
just said that you were able to observe the Soviet exit from 
Afghanistan. In many ways, the United States today faces 
tough choices similar to those that the Russians faced at 
that time, and you have been able to observe both events. 
Do you have any reflections on that?
NICKELSBERG: At the time, I could see why the Soviets 
were going to withdraw completely, although that took 
a number of years, until Moscow’s financial aid to Kabul 
dissipated. The Soviets got their last troops out of Afghani-
stan in the winter of 1989, yet they remained engaged on 
a political level for a number of years until they saw that 
it was unaffordable and decided to cut their losses. Then 
the mujahedeen took power in 1992. I think the Soviets 
understood that this would happen, but again in the 
political environment at the time, it is hard for an army 
or a government to withdraw or retreat. They have to put 
a pretty selective spin on it for consumption, not only for 
the general public, but institutionally as well. As for the 
current American involvement and limited withdrawal, 
or retrograde, as it is called—speaking from my long time 
on the ground, I hope that we remain engaged there. 
Properly engaged. I happened to be in Kabul in January 
of 1991 at close to 6,000 feet. It was a gray, snowy, awful 
day in winter. Something came up: we heard that the 
Americans were going to close the US embassy. There was a 
flag-lowering ceremony that we could go to. An Associated 
Press photographer and I went, and we watched the flag 
come down at the US embassy. It’s hard to photograph a 
flag coming down and capture the impact in still images. 
There are a number of ways you can do it—the flag being 
folded or whatever. But I was stricken. I could not believe 
this was happening. 
Our embassy remained closed until September or October 
of 2001. For 10 years, the United States had no official 
presence in Afghanistan. This is complete lunacy, was my 
feeling. It sent a signal to the other countries in the region 
that they could go for it—go for the pie. Put their flag in 
regional or cultural areas of Afghanistan where they had an 
affinity, and then they’d be able to leverage their political 
influence. And sure enough, that happened. When 
Uzbekistan came in from the north, for instance, you saw 
Turkey align with the Uzbeks because the Uzbek language 
is Turkic. You certainly had Iran—in 1979, the Ayatollah 
Khomeini was already coming into Kabul to promote the 
Islamic Revolution.3 The Saudis were in there big time, 
spreading the Wahhabi doctrine through jihadis and trying 
to block the Iranians. The Indians and the Pakistanis had 
their roles, and the Chinese of course were the silent—but 
very well-informed—observers in the bleachers. I saw that 
played out not just in Kabul, but regionally. 
It is essential that we learn from these… not necessarily 
mistakes, but blunders, I would say. How can we remain 
closed off from a country for 10 years and then all of a 
sudden be surprised that al Qaeda hatches out of the egg? 
Prior to 1988, it was nearly impossible to get visas from 
the Soviet officials to visit Kabul. They didn’t allow media, 
including their own, into the country. So once visas began 
to be issued to allow coverage of their withdrawal in May 
MAY 1988: An Afghan soldier hands a flag in solidarity to a 
departing Soviet soldier in Kabul on the first day of the army’s 
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
MARCH 1989: Afghan mujahideen move toward the front 
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1988, I realized I would no longer have to trek in for two or three weeks with the 
mujahedeen to get very rural pictures. Before this time, I had never been able 
to photograph Kabul or the more urban areas, or even the provincial capitals, 
which I needed to see. It became a new chapter after nine years of backpacking 
into Afghanistan from Pakistan. So I made it a goal to get as many visas as 
possible, to visit as often as possible. Whenever the Time writer was going, I 
certainly wanted to be along. 
During the Afghan Civil War in the mid-1990s, we had access to official visas 
and went in. We got to see how the conflict was playing out for different fac-
tions, whether it was a neighborhood, a province, a district, a mountain range, 
a mountain pass, a market. It was like a three-dimensional game of chess, in 
which you had to be quiet and observe properly to figure out who the forces 
were and how they were playing one off the other. Revenge is a very important 
word among many of the cultures of South Asia and the Middle East—there 
are a lot of terms and keywords in that region of the world that Americans are 
unaware of. There is no court system. People in the provinces don’t appeal to the 
capital for help. Everything is decided locally, through the elders—justice, water 
rights, roadways, rights of way. Everything is decided locally. The provinces want 
very little to do with Kabul. They don’t trust officials from the central govern-
ment. This was something I had to learn, and I could see applying that knowl-
edge to rural areas of South Asia as well. People were still talking about 1947 and 
the historical separation after the British Empire decided to divide India into 
East Pakistan, India, and West Pakistan.4 The people were blinded by anger: the 
Hindus who had to leave their ancestral lands and properties in Pakistan and 
cross over into India, and the Muslims who had to leave India and relocate to 
Pakistan. The hatred, the anger, the anxiety that this caused completely blinded 
them to the facts: “It was a legal entity, we used to live there. Our farm was 
there. We lost everything.” 
So all of these forces are at play in Afghanistan, and the Americans have to 
remain engaged. It is a learning process to comprehend how delicate things are 
there. There is no past in geopolitics. Modern history doesn’t exist in Afghani-
stan. So this is very much a challenge for soldiers, statesmen, and diplomats, and 
also for the aid organizations that go there. It is essential that we become more 
effective at being observers. Yes, Americans want to be liked and appreciated 
for what we do and what we have to offer, but at the same time people consider 
us naïve, and there is a reason for that. We seem to be the last ones to “get it.” 
I think that most Americans’ understanding is improving now, but we have 
APRIL 1991: Afghan mujahideen inspect a Kabul 
government plane after they seized Khost. 
APRIL 1992: Afghan Uzbek fighters during the mujahideen seizure of 
Kabul.
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a situation with the withdrawal from Kabul and Afghanistan where we can’t 
repeat the mistakes of the past, such as when we were diverted in 2003 to go into 
Iraq—big mistake. That also sent a signal to the countries in the region that we 
weren’t serious. These political decisions will come back to haunt us, and I see 
that readily on the ground when I go back to the region. 
BLANKEN: It sounds like even from the early days you had close contact with 
the people of Afghanistan, including the mujahedeen. Over the period that you 
have engaged with the people of Afghanistan, have you seen their attitudes, or 
the way that they think about the United States, change?
NICKELSBERG: The American military forces were appreciated and liked when 
they first got there. There were high expectations, and a lot of promises were 
made. But once those promises weren’t delivered, the US presence was looked 
at differently. Not so much the individual, but still, I have learned to maintain 
a certain distance from strangers until they figure out that I am not the enemy, 
that I am an outsider. You have to take care and observe. You don’t know, for in-
stance, how many people a family may have lost in an explosion or in some kind 
of violent incident that may have involved Americans—or NATO. So I think the 
affinity that we Americans have with local people remains. But there is a lot of 
doubt now in the local population about our commitment to them, and they 
are worried about their future. They worry differently from how we do. They 
worry about four years from now, not just about today. They have daughters who 
have to get married in the traditional way of arranged marriages, and they worry 
about whether the schools will be working in four to five years or next year, not 
just next week. They don’t so much look at their watches—they worry season-
ally—they worry about six months, 12 months, 18 months from now. 
So their whole concept of the environment is different from ours, and we 
have to remain in sync with that. We can’t figure these things out and gain the 
knowledge in, say, a 24-month deployment. And even that is essentially only 18 
months, because you spend the first three months orientating yourself and the 
last three months exiting, so you have just 18 months to accomplish anything. 
The Afghans who work with us are still saying, “Now, somebody else was sitting 
in that chair the last time I was here. You look similar, but how long are you 
staying here?” A handshake is a handshake, and that kind of proximity is often 
MARCH 1993: A Kabul family flees its home during factional 
fighting between President Rabbani’s government forces and 
opposition fighters in western Kabul.
SEPTEMBER 1996: Taliban soldiers fire a rocket at retreating 
forces of the Northern Alliance army north of Kabul. The 
capital fell to the Taliban on September 27, 1996.
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essential, but commitment to engage is very important to 
Afghans. As for language ability, I think they understand 
that we are not going to learn much more than European 
languages, but we need to learn Farsi. We need to learn 
Pashto, or Urdu, or Hindi. That is essential. I think parts 
of the Special Forces and most military area experts 
understand that. While you can’t expect every corporal 
or private to learn a second or third language, certainly an 
appreciation for the customs and traditions of the place 
that we are going into with a gun is essential. 
BLANKEN: You had extensive experience not only in 
Afghanistan but also in Iraq. If we can switch gears, a 
theme from your Afghanistan experiences is this notion 
that disengagement can allow things to get out of control. 
That provides a nice segue to Iraq. What are your thoughts 
on how things in Iraq have developed? 
NICKELSBERG: Well, al Qaeda developed in Afghani-
stan, or at least flourished in Afghanistan, and what is 
happening in Iraq and Syria right now could easily have 
happened in Afghanistan. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, this was the template: I went into some of the 
Arab-Afghan training camps along the Pakistani-Afghan 
border to look for Indian Kashmiris who were being 
trained in these camps and then sent by the Inter-Services 
Intelligence—Pakistan’s intelligence agency—back across 
Pakistan into Kashmir to fight the Indian Army. To us, 
Kashmir was a small, low-intensity conflict, but it was not 
low intensity for the region. It had quite serious ramifica-
tions, and I watched that situation evolve in 1989. I went 
to a training camp along the border in Khost Province, 
four kilometers inside Afghanistan, to interview Jalaluddin 
Haqqani, who was maintaining these training camps and 
became the primary ally for Osama bin Laden and the 
Arab-Afghan fighters. I was with a Pashtun BBC stringer 
(freelance reporter) who was also working for Time 
magazine, along with a few other reporters. 
Haqqani didn’t care what passport I had at that point. He 
was welcoming. He would protect his guests as he did other 
Arab fighters—that is their traditional form of hospitality. 
He said yes, he was training the Kashmiris. In fact, I could 
see them. We arrived at four o’clock in the afternoon, when 
the men were coming back from physical exercise, and I 
could spot them. But yet, many others in the Arab-Islamic 
world were also represented at these camps, including 
Chinese Uyghurs. The Uyghurs were still being trained in 
these camps. I could tell that the Arabs and Central Asians 
were not going to go away in 1992, once they had control 
over Kabul. Haqqani was going to stay with these camps, 
and of course he clearly exploited his position—as head 
of the Zadran tribe, and of a large cross-border trade and 
smuggling enterprise—with the Pakistanis, who still use 
these camps in turn as leverage against India.5 What I mean 
is, to properly understand Afghanistan, you must under-
stand Pakistan. To properly understand Pakistan, you must 
understand India. They are inseparable. To expect soldiers 
to understand Afghanistan without first understanding 
Pakistan is not only difficult but dangerous. 
So I saw Iraq start to unfold in 2002. In April of that year, 
I was sitting in a warehouse, an old Soviet hangar, on Ba-
gram air base in Afghanistan, showing a reporter my pic-
tures from the previous few days. Bagram had become the 
main base for US and NATO forces after 2001. The reporter 
and I were the only ones in the hangar at the time, and the 
only light came from my laptop. An Arab-American came 
over to us, and it was clear to me right then that he was 
a contract worker, most likely an interpreter. He wasn’t a 
soldier; he was in civilian clothes. He wanted to see the 
pictures, so I explained to him where I had been, and then 
October 1996: A Taliban mullah speaks to a crowd 
gathered in central Kabul after Taliban forces took control 
from the Rabbani government.
FEBRUARY 2001: Men carry the body of a one-year-old boy to a 
cemetery before a traditional Islamic burial at the Maslakh refugee 
camp outside Herat.
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it was time for us to ask the “20 questions.”6 He told us he 
had been hired to come to Afghanistan from, I think, the 
Midwest, the Detroit area, where there are a lot of Arabic 
speakers. He was there to interrogate al Qaeda suspects 
who had been captured and brought into Bagram. US 
forces were still chasing al Qaeda in central Afghanistan. 
The American said, “I’m not here for long. I’m leaving.” 
Both the reporter and I looked at him, surprised. “You’re 
leaving? We just got here.” It was April 2002. American 
forces had only been in Afghanistan a few months, but I 
had already heard rumors about Iraq. We asked, “Where 
are you going?” He made a movement with his head: over 
there. He was going somewhere in the Middle East to start 
setting up, he told us.
My jaw dropped. If he was leaving, that meant Special Forces 
were leaving, and intelligence people were leaving, and that 
told me right there that the US commitment to Afghanistan 
was gone and that Washington was going to refocus on 
Iraq. If you think Afghanistan is complicated, Iraq, which 
has been around for thousands of years, is at the top of the 
Arab food chain. It is an incredibly complicated country; 
and throughout the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein had 
basically been inciting Iraq’s Sunnis against Shi’a Iran. This 
is not getting into the weeds, but into the reality of what we 
have today. It isn’t about oil; it is a fight between Sunnis and 
Shi’as. No doubt about it. And this is a serious fight. The 
people think with their hearts, not with their heads, when 
it comes religion and ethnicity. This battle between Sunni 
and Shi’a is centuries old, and it is a hatred that is ongoing 
today, even though they are living right next to one another. 
When it comes time for trouble or violence, people imme-
diately choose sides. Along with other journalist friends and 
diplomats I had spoken to, I was convinced that to go after 
Iraq and take our eye off of Afghanistan was to invite chaos, 
and this is where we are at today. 
I happened to be with the Marine battalion that took 
down the statue of Saddam Hussein.7 I was not in the 
periphery—I was right there in Firdos Square in Baghdad. 
At three o’clock that afternoon we got orders to go there, 
and we watched the statue come down. There were few 
people there really cheering because the locals knew that 
this was a Saddam neighborhood. Everyone knew that 
this invasion was going to create chaos. Victory would be 
momentary, and that would be it. The so-called victory 
symbolized by pulling down one statue would just unleash 
the flood of hatred and violence and revenge, and this is 
what we are going through now. We essentially gave Iraq 
to Iran, and that is what angered the Sunni governments 
in the Middle East. It’s going to be very hard to put this 
shattered region back together. The United States needs 
to be a player in this region, but we are not automatically 
given a seat at the table in the way that we were used to, as 
an informed advisor. We need to remember these things 
when it comes to the Great Game, which I think is still 
being played out.8
You can see the Sunni-Shi’a divide in Pakistan and India. 
India has over 175 million Muslims, and they are also 
divided into Sunni and Shi’a. Particularly in Pakistan 
during the holy month of Muharram, when Shi’as parade 
and flagellate themselves, it is traditional for the Sunnis 
to stand on the sides and throw rocks or aggravate and 
taunt them and harass them. They learn that as little kids, 
this kind of back and forth between Sunni and Shi’a. Even 
though they are friends and classmates and neighbors, 
when it comes down to it, they are ready to fight each 
other. There is no way that the red, white, and blue way 
Americans have traditionally planted our flag and hoped 
for peace and tranquility through some kind of aid and 
economic development is going to matter anymore. This 
divide has been apparent in my lifetime since the Iranian 
Revolution in 1978–1979, when the Ayatollah Khomeini 
came in and kicked the Shah out. Since then, the Saudis, 
Kuwaitis, Qataris, and the Emirates have all been pushing 
back to make sure the people of this culture—the Shi’a 
and Iranian world, the Persians—have been kept in their 
DECEMBER 2001: A foreign al Qaeda fighter captured at Tora 
Bora is presented at a village near Jalalabad after three weeks of 
fighting and US bombing.
DECEMBER 2001: Pakistan Taliban captured outside of Kabul 
while fighting Northern Alliance troops.
February 2015
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place. That is what the overall battle has been about, and it is still playing out in 
Pakistan, such as in Karachi when the Imambargah, a Shi’a mosque, recently was 
blown up. There is a pattern. The bombing may be only a three-paragraph piece 
in the local newspaper, but it is reported, and people make note of it and just 
deal with it. Westerners don’t know how to deal with that. 
BLANKEN: You not only had experience looking at Afghanistan and the people 
of Iraq, but you have also intimately observed US forces, both in the field and on 
Parris Island, I believe, to see how our forces are selected and trained. Are they 
really capable of understanding the dynamics of these conflicts and the way that 
we employ forces, or are we demanding too much understanding of nuances—
political nuances, cultural nuances—from our troops? I mean, are they capable 
of understanding these concepts and adjudicating them effectively? 
NICKELSBERG: That’s a very good question. I think a lot is put onto the heads 
and shoulders of new recruits, not just to qualify for the Special Forces and get 
through basic training, but also to specialize once they are out of basic training 
and deployed. But a lot of that depends on the military and political leadership 
and the priorities they select. It is a very diverse world we send our soldiers into, 
yet everything is done in black and white in the military. There is very little gray 
area. Those who choose to pursue the gray areas usually go off into a specialized 
field or become intelligence officers or get into communications and encryption 
and information security. That kind of specialization is required in any military 
and in the public spheres as well.
There needs to be a change, for instance, in how we treat people. When the US 
military went into Iraq in 2003, I was with the tip of the spear, so to speak—I 
purposely asked for that position. The troops were going through villages, and 
I heard the Marines start to call the locals hajis. This term is an honorific in the 
Islamic world. It’s someone who has made the pilgrimage—the hajj—to Mecca. 
This is something that all Muslims aspire, wish, hope to do at least once in their 
life. Haji is an honorific that those who have made the journey sometimes put 
at the front of their names. The Marines were calling them hajis in a derogatory 
way: “Haji, come here.” Silently I said to myself, “We are screwed.” This is going 
to be the way we treat Iraqis, and Iraqis are at the top of the Arabic social order. 
At least, they consider themselves to be. If I am going to be here, I thought, I am 
going to start documenting that behavior. It’s hard to take a picture of that sort 
of thing, but I heard it over and over and over again. The US troops would put 
MARCH 2002: A US soldier stands over a dead Taliban 
fighter in the Shah-i-Kot Valley, Paktia province, during 
Operation Anaconda.
AUGUST 2006: Three wounded US Army soldiers from the 10th 
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the head man of the village on the ground in his clean dishdasha and demand, 
“Where are the enemy?” But you should do just the opposite. You should wine 
and dine the head man and then surround and take temporary control of the 
village. How dared they put the head man down? They did not understand 
village dynamics. If you treat the head man with respect, he will treat you with 
respect and may even give you some information. In that part of the world, the 
last thing you do is put the head man on the ground to dirty him and show that 
much disrespect to him. I was just shocked. Even as a journalist, I knew how you 
take care of the elder, how you search a room full of people and immediately 
find the head man, if you want to get your job done. You will get what you want, 
but if you show any disrespect, if you go around him, that person can shut you 
down or make life very difficult for you. 
The Americans were doing just the opposite. They were going after information 
in the wrong way from day one, before the statue came down. I saw no hope. I 
saw this insensitive behavior as a strike against us, as simple as that. Those are the 
things we have to learn. Men don’t touch women, for instance. When you go 
through a house searching for things, you have women go through the women’s 
belongings. The culture has to be respected. It has to be. If it’s not, you’re going to 
have a knife in your back as you leave the village. Disrespect will be remembered 
more than the water well that you just gave them. These are simple things. This is 
a long answer to your question, but soldiers, Marines, need to be told these things 
as much as they are shown how to strip a rifle and put it back together again and 
hit a target. Cultural awareness is essential, and it should have been included in 
training long ago. The Russians spoke Farsi, Pashto, and Uzbek when they went 
into Afghanistan. But the Russians also killed a million people in less than 10 
years. That’s a lot of people to kill—over 100,000 a year. They carpet bombed, 
they slaughtered, and they put people up against the wall and shot them. They 
annihilated villages and created four to six million refugees. That is the way Rus-
sians deal with people. We have to learn something from that. 
Afghans genuinely like Americans. They also want to see how much money they 
can fleece from us, but we freely give it away. We have to find a knowledgeable 
way to deal with foreign countries; we need to be able to go over there not only 
as diplomats, but as scholars as well. It is becoming more and more dangerous to 
go to the Middle East and South Asia. Part of the reason for that is our naïveté. I 
MARCH 2009: Afghan National Police stand at a guard post in 
Qarabagh, Ghazni province. More than 40 of the 464 villages in 
Qarabagh district were controlled by the Taliban.
MAY 16, 2013: The remains of a Chevrolet Suburban are 
removed after a suicide bomber rammed his car into a 
NATO convoy in Kabul. The explosion killed 16 people.
February 2015
61
once had a tour of the US embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, and the staff were very 
proud to say there were 25 miles of razor wire around the place. Twenty-five miles 
of razor wire? Do you know how hard it is for a Pakistani to get a visa to come to 
America now? They have to apply, they have to take a special bus to a certain place 
and wait there, and if they miss that appointment they have to reapply, which 
takes another six months—by that time they are pulling their hair out. And that’s 
just to get maybe a student visa. Pakistanis still want to come to the United States, 
but we make it so difficult, and we just don’t understand. Yes, there are security 
issues, without a doubt, but we advertise our presence in the strangest ways. How 
easy is it to find the Americans in a strange land? Just look for the black Chevrolet 
Suburban SUV going by. Those are the Americans. So that’s the RPG (rocket-
propelled grenade) target. We are the only country that does that. 
Lowering the American flag in Kabul in 1991 and not reappearing for 10 years, 
until after 9/11 occurred, was misguided and irresponsible. We risk doing the 
same thing today. I hope we won’t leave Afghanistan—and I don’t think we 
will entirely—but we can’t leave just a residual force. Our personnel have to be 
actively engaging with the people. It is the same with Iraq. Look at the size of 
the embassy we built there. How are they going to be able to keep it secure now? 
ISIS forces were 15 miles outside of Baghdad a few days ago. So we need to learn 
from the past and figure out how we can compensate for the tactical or strategic 
mistakes we made. I have heard people say that the 2003 invasion was most 
likely the biggest foreign policy blunder ever, including Vietnam. The situation 
in those countries is extremely complicated, and we need more people who 
understand the region.
BLANKEN: You mentioned earlier that you’ve also done work in South America, 
and even in the United States on urban gangs. To wrap things up, do you have 
any reflections on the general issues of violence, nonstate actors, and the prob-
lems of maintaining order in societies? You’ve seen a lot, so where do you think 
we go from here? Is this the end of our vision of the stable, nation-state–driven 
world? I know that’s a big question, but you have a really interesting perspective. 
NICKELSBERG: Well, it’s a very credible question, and we could spend hours 
talking about it. Americans have become too risk averse, in my opinion. We are 
guided by technology and expect that technology will solve a lot of these prob-
lems. The amount of time kids spend in front of a computer screen versus the 
amount of time that they should be spending outside is 
worrisome. For instance, 18-year olds would rather not 
go out to hunt deer. That affects the deer population 
and how many deer we hit on the road. Our addiction 
to technology has crazy consequences, and people are 
becoming couch potatoes, on the one hand. But on the 
other hand, the problem is our fear and anxiety about 
trouble next door and our not really wanting to deal 
with it. I think a lot of this is reflected in the recent 
economic cutbacks as well. But we need to understand 
what goes on in our backyard and become involved. 
Community commitment and service to the com-
munity, such as civic action, are values that we need 
to instill in more children. The educational system 
has been hurt by economic cutbacks, and academics 





May 16, 2013: Car and truck traffic back up near an intersection  
under the Pul-e-Sokhta bridge in western Kabul. 
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their free time in the afternoon in tutorial sessions or trying to get ahead in their 
education. 
In South Los Angeles, there is a map of the neighborhoods on the wall in the 
police department showing the precincts that these police work in. The map is 
divided into ethnic groups, and a policeman has to understand that the color of 
a baseball cap, such as Dodger blue or Angel red, is a signal of gang association. 
If there’s a shooting, the gang unit has to know who the shooter’s and victim’s 
girlfriends are. The police on the ground understand that kind of information, 
not only for their own survival, but also for how they try to keep the peace. 
Children are aware of those dynamics, but I have a feeling that the rest of us 
are not exposed to the dynamics. My overall feeling is that many people are too 
sheltered right now. People have a lot of knowledge from sitting at the computer, 
but they don’t actually physically experience these things. 
There is no green space in Los Angeles, for instance. The only time many kids 
get out to a mountain trail is on a school trip. Believe me, they never touch soil 
in some parts of the inner city in Los Angeles, because if there is any land left, 
it’s taken over for development. So the kids have no contact with the natural 
world. There are risks out there, certainly, but I also think awareness of what 
these risks actually are should be raised more frequently. Americans certainly run 
into diversity—Spanish is spoken everywhere. But I’ve seen the hatred towards 
Muslims that arose after 9/11 in certain neighborhoods, and it is certainly on the 
uptick now that ISIS has been killing Westerners on tape. That has had a direct 
effect on certain Muslim populations around the country. We Americans just 
need to be more well-informed, to reach out more now, and to deliver more 
visas to those who want to come here and study. It’s essential that we open those 
channels for exchange. v
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SERE on the Silver Screen by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp
The “war movie” genre, typified by tales of face-to-face combat, 
offers an additional perspective on courage and endurance in human conflict: 
the prisoner-of-war (POW) film. Stories of criminals (or unjustly sentenced 
innocents) who are incarcerated and who escape from civil prisons are long-
standing favorites in American cinema. These films include Each Dawn I Die 
(1939), White Heat (1949), Cool Hand Luke (1967), Papillon (1973), Escape from 
Alcatraz (1979), The Shawshank Redemption (1994), and The Count of Monte 
Cristo (the most recent adaptation released in 2002), to mention only a few. In 
these cases, escape itself is a crime.
Soldiers, however, are obliged by their profession to refuse sur-
render, evade capture, and, if captured, escape. In 1955, the United 
States Armed Forces formally established a Code of Conduct for its 
members, which specifies: “If I am captured I will continue to resist 
by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid 
others to escape.”1 This principle is the central theme in some of the 
earliest POW movies, in which British cinema has led the way. The 
Wooden Horse (1950), a film about a clever ruse for tunneling out 
of the German Stammlager Luft III POW camp, was a commercial 
success when it was released. It was followed by Albert R. N. (1953), 
billed as “The War’s Most Daring POW Escape!”; The Colditz Story 
(1955); The One That Got Away (1957), about a Luftwaffe pilot who 
repeatedly slips away from his British captors; and others. Many 
films of this type were based on best-selling World War II memoirs.
The success of the recent book and film Unbroken (2014)—the 
true-life account of an Olympic athlete-airman held by the Japanese 
army during World War II—calls attention to similar films about the 
bitter hardships inside prison camps and the bravery of those who 
survive and find a way out. These accounts can be useful for study 
by present-day military personnel, particularly members of special 
operations units who are sent into “denied areas”: deep in hostile 
territory, isolated, and far from support or any ready means of 
returning to friendly lines. The following are a few of the best, along 
with some strong runners-up.
World War II
The Bridge on the River Kwai (1957) follows several storylines that 
begin and then reconverge at a Japanese POW camp in Siam (now 
Thailand). An American prisoner who senses his days are numbered 
escapes the camp and then evades his Japanese pursuers through trackless jungle. 
A British battalion that surrendered at Singapore arrives in the camp, and its 
commander collaborates with the Japanese to build “a proper bridge” for their 
supply trains. Besides aiding the enemy, he also forbids his men to attempt 
escapes; but he has a powerful rationale for his decisions. The moral questions 
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facing the POWs are complex, with no easy answers. When the movie was 
released, former Allied prisoners of war picketed at theaters in England 
and Australia, protesting that the movie underplayed Japanese cruelty 
and atrocities during World War II. Nevertheless, The Bridge on the River 
Kwai won seven Oscars, including Best Picture.
Two acclaimed American POW films set in wartime Germany are Stalag 
17 (1953) and The Great Escape (1963). The tension inside the fictitious 
Stalag 17 POW camp grows from the realization among the imprisoned 
US aircrewmen that their escape attempts are being foiled by one of their 
own men who has turned informer. The Great Escape is set in the same 
Stalag complex as The Wooden Horse and is based on a historical account 
of the mass escape of more than 50 Allied POWs. An interesting aspect 
of this film is the depiction of the secret internal organization of the 
prisoners, from their leadership structure to the “committees” performing 
functions like logistics (aka scrounging), intelligence, tunneling, and se-
curity. It is evident in both these movies that Allied aircrews in German 
POW camps did not suffer the same cruelties that were inflicted by the 
Japanese on their compatriots or, in the wars to follow, by the North 
Koreans, Communist Chinese, and North Vietnamese.
The Soviet Gulag
The Way Back (2010) sets a high standard for distance traveled on foot 
during evasion: 6,500 kilometers to freedom. Based on The Long Walk, 
the 1956 memoir of a Polish POW imprisoned by the Soviets during 
World War II, the film crisply depicts the savage Siberian Gulag (the 
Russian acronym for Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps 
and Labor Settlements). A band of escaped prisoners—Poles, a Latvian, 
a Yugoslav, a Russian, and, interestingly enough, an American—walks 
across frozen Siberia, the burning Gobi Desert, and the stony Himalayas 
to haven in British India. Not everyone makes it. Well directed (by Peter 
Weir, of Master and Commander fame), well acted, and splendidly pho-
tographed, it underscores the central importance of the will to survive, 
and the fundamental human longing for freedom.
Other Gulag films include One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1970), 
from the bestselling novel by Gulag survivor Alexander Solzhenitsyn. 
This story is about perseverance and endurance, when escape is impos-
sible. In As Far As My Feet Will Carry Me (2001), a German soldier 
captured by the Russians in 1945 is sentenced to 25 years in a Gulag camp 
on the Arctic Circle. He escapes, and despite speaking only a few words 
of Russian, journeys all the way to Iran and, finally, home. This German-
made film is similar to The Way Back, but it does not have quite the same 
cinematic fluency and impact as Weir’s excellent work.
Vietnam
While some have questioned the accuracy of all the events portrayed in 
Rescue Dawn (2006), the film’s realistic depiction of US Navy A1E Sky-
raider pilot Dieter Dengler’s experience as a POW has won praise. During 
SERE training in the United States, Dengler had escaped simulated 
captivity twice and actually gained weight during the rigorous course—
feats that earned him regard among his peers. When he was shot down 
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over Laos in 1966, the Pathet Lao quickly captured him and subsequently 
punished him for his resistance to “re-education.” He lost 93 pounds 
during his four months as a POW (the actors shed significant body 
weight for their roles). Even so, director Werner Herzog deliberately 
chose not to depict the worst of the physical and psychological torture 
their captors inflicted on the POWs. After escaping, Dengler evaded his 
pursuers in dense jungle for 23 days before successfully signaling a passing 
US Air Force Skyraider with a parachute he recovered from an expended 
illumination flare. There is one more rescue scene: Navy SEALs spirited 
Dengler from the airbase hospital where he was recovering back to his 
aircraft carrier and shipmates. Rescue Dawn was well received by critics, 
and most reviewers placed it in the top 10 movies of 2006.
There are two other Vietnam-era POW movies to consider. The experience 
of American POWs in the Hoa Lo prison in Hanoi is the subject of Hanoi 
Hilton (1987), a disappointment at the box office but a favorite among 
Vietnam veterans as a rental video. It was rereleased in 2008 in DVD 
format, with the addition of interviews with former POWs, including 
Senator John McCain. Bat-21 (1988) depicts a race between American 
and North Vietnamese forces to find a high-ranking US electronic war-
fare officer shot down over enemy territory (his call sign: Bat-21 Bravo). 
The movie is based on an actual search-and-rescue effort that remains 
controversial within the US Air Force because strike jets were diverted 
from supporting major operations in South Vietnam, and SAR aircraft 
and crewmembers were lost during the 11-day-long recovery attempt. In 
this regard, Bat-21 provides a basis for debate on this topic.
Denied Areas
Most E & E (escape and evasion) movies are set during large-scale conventional 
wars, in which the roles of combatants and prisoners of war can readily be 
understood through internationally accepted conventions. But what about the 
gray zone between peace and war, where self-proclaimed rebel governments 
are not actually capable of exercising the authority that a sovereign nation is 
expected to wield within its borders and over its own citizens?
Argo (2012) takes place in this “realm of uncertainty,” while Iran was at 
full boil following the ouster of the Shah by Shi’a revolutionaries in 1979. 
The Canadian ambassador secretly gave refuge to six US embassy staffers 
who avoided capture by Iranian student radicals who stormed and seized 
the embassy of the “Great Satan” in Tehran. Hidden in the ambassador’s 
home, the six Americans could see no way to get out of Iran without 
being discovered and arrested. Undaunted, a CIA specialist in extracting 
personnel from denied areas developed a plan for their rescue. After 
elaborate (and very entertaining) preparations, he flew to Tehran and 
successfully facilitated their escape. Deception was the key to success, and 
deceptions created by canny prisoners are highlights of almost every POW 
escape movie ever made.
Viewers should keep in mind that the Canadian government actually 
conceived and managed almost the entire operation, with the CIA in a 
supporting role, a fact that was publicly affirmed by then-US President 
Jimmy Carter. But as Canadian ambassador Ken Taylor said, “I realize 
this is a movie, and you have to keep the audience on the edge of their 
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seats.”2 Argo succeeds as a movie—it won three Oscars, including Best Picture—
and dramatically depicts the likely political, social, and security environment 
where special operations personnel may expect to find themselves on future 
missions. There may not be barbed-wire fences lit by guard-tower searchlights, 
prisoners tunneling with stolen spoons, or bravura face-offs between POW camp 
commandants and imprisoned officers who cite Geneva Convention rules. Sur-
vival, escape, resistance, and evasion in urban warfare against stateless terrorists 
may require a rewrite of the script of the classic prisoner-of-war film. v
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